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SUMMARY
1.1 Description of the Study
This report describes an analysis of the development policy for
thermionic reactors to provide electric propulsion and power for space
exploration. It was conducted for the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL), under
a NASA master contract, and was performed by the Decision Analysis Group
of Stanford Research Institute (SRI), with the assistance of JPL, NASA,
and Gulf General Atomic (GGA) personnel.
The initial aim of the analysis was to evaluate alternatives for
developing a thermionic reactor. The decision to develop such a reactor
for nuclear electric propulsion should be made within the policy for
•future space exploration. Consequently, methods were needed for char-
acterizing and assessing space exploration strategies, but only to the
level of detail required to provide an appropriate background for the
thermionic reactor decision.
The study was performed using decision analysis, a discipline that
comprises the philosophy, methodology, and professional practice neces-
sary to formalize the analysis of decisions. The contribution of the
Decision Analysis Group was to characterize the logical structure of the
decision through formal models and provide a language for describing
pertinent information. The contribution of JPL, NASA, and GGA repre-
sentatives was to provide technological expertise, obtain necessary data,
and gather judgments regarding NASA preferences.
The resulting decision model provides a unique approach to advanced
propulsion planning by determining the long-term effects of various pro-
pulsion alternatives, technological developments, planetary exploration
strategies, mission model sizes, and time preference judgments on the
thermionic development policy. The models account not only for the
direct costs incurred with various development policies, but also for
the social benefits, for example from scientific accomplishments, and
social costs, such as time delay of accomplishments.
The model is implemented by a computer program that (1) determines
the cost (within the concept of a planetary exploration strategy) of
accomplishing missions with all available propulsion systems (including
effects of flight time and spacecraft" power availability); (2) selects
the most effective propulsion system available to fly each mission; and
(3) evaluates the benefits received in terms of missions accomplished
and the timing of benefits. These effects are economically balanced to
determine the desirability of any development policy. An important fea-
ture of the model is its ability to rate any development policy in terms
of the present value of national profit. This measure of system value
allows the effect of changes in both the- development policy and the
project environment to be determined quantitatively.
It should be noted at this point that during the course of this
analysis, the U.S. thermionic project was terminated because of budgetary
considerations. SRI's work, which was supported by a subcontract, was
terminated at the same time. Therefore, only about two-thirds of the
work originally proposed was completed.
The termination has had three principal effects on this project.
First, the data and the model structure have not been carefully reviewed
with JPL and NASA personnel. Second, since we did not have the necessary
value judgments from NASA, many cases under various sets of value assump-
tions are presented. Thus, more data are presented than would be the
case for a more thoroughly digested final report on a completed project.
Third, the analysis never proceeded beyond the deterministic stage. Much
of the benefits to NASA decision-makers from using decision analysis would
derive from more powerful ways to treat uncertainty and to quantify risk.*
It is unfortunate therefore that the decision analysis was terminated
before the probabilistic phase was undertaken.
These problems restrict the absolute validity of our findings, but
probably do not alter the basic insights and tendencies observed. This
report also illustrates an approach to the modeling needed for decision-
making that should be useful to JPL and NASA personnel. The simplicity
of the models developed and the small amount of data required should make
the decision analysis a useful, complementary tool to the very detailed
Advanced Propulsion Comparison (APC) study conducted concurrently by
NASA, JPL, Mathematica, and Lockheed.
1.2 Findings and Insights
Even at our incomplete level of analysis, it appears that the devel-
opment of a thermionic reactor for nuclear electric propulsion can be
economically justified under many reasonable sets of assumptions. The
basic assumptions that strongly affect whether NASA should be developing
*
See Appendix A for an introduction to risk preference theory.
a nuclear electric propulsion system are the value assigned to planetary
exploration and NASA's time preference.
Both are judgments that must come from NASA's top management. The
value assigned to planetary exploration may be measured in terms of an
annual budget, a specific mission set over a fixed time period, or an
appropriate annual number of missions. For example, the APC extended
mission set (21 missions over 12 years - see Table 3.1) averages about
2 missions a year, whereas the von Braun mission set (9 missions over
8 years - see Table 3.1) averages about one mission per year. NASA's
time preference is based on the future benefits that the agency must
realize to justify a current investment. This is most easily repre-
sented by a discount rate, which reduces the value of payments received
in the future.* A true constant dollar time preference can be expressed
by an effective discount rate: the discount rate less the inflation rate.
In terms of these basic value measures, if NASA either desires to
perform a planetary exploration program at least as ambitious as the APC
base model or accepts an effective discount rate no higher than 5%, then
nuclear electric propulsion appears to increase the present value of
national profit by more than its development cost (compare Tables 5.4
and 5.5 with Table 5.3). If, however, the von Braun mission model more
closely represents the value of planetary exploration to the nation and
a 10% effective discount rate represents NASA's time preference, then
the developments cost of nuclear electric propulsion cannot be justified.
Moreover, under the assumptions that nuclear electric propulsion is eco-
nomically justified, a 240 kWe spiral escape system is superior to a
120 kWe system which uses Centaur as a direct escape stage (see Table 5.2)
In short, the same conditions that favor nuclear electric propulsion at
all tend to favor a higher power level than the reference design, within
the limitations of this analysis (see footnote on page 4).
Another important finding of this analysis is the critical role of
mission values and time preference in design trade-offs. In economic
models that consider only the cost of missions without quantifying their
values, the main cost resulting from the longer flight times of less
capable propulsion systems represents a very small operating cost during
the added trip time. A much larger conceptual cost results from the delay
in achieving the mission goals and the discount rate. The value of a
mission (which must be larger than its cost for logical procedures to
*
For example, a 10% discount rate means that one needs to receive a
minimum of $1.10 per year in the future to warrant investing $1.00
today. With inflation, however, the $1.10 next year actually has less
purchasing power than $1.10 would today, so the discount rate is ef-
fectively reduced by inflation.
apply) is many hundreds of millions of dollars. Such a value, discounted
for even a modest time delay, may be substantially reduced in absolute
terms. This effect greatly influences the importance of the specific
weight of the reactor relative to its unit cost (see Section 3.7). The
APC study embodies the same general effect by assuming equal target
arrival dates for the various available propulsion systems. Delaying
a launch allows the mission costs of more capable propulsion systems to
be postponed, which effectively reduces these costs because of discounting.
1.3 Recommenda t i ons
The following recommendations are made within the context of our
incomplete analysis and regarding a currently defunct program:
(1) Retain nuclear electric propulsion as an option in all
current and future economic analyses of advanced pro-
pulsion, such as the APC study, but at a low level of
detail.
(2) (a) Seek a clear statement .of the size of mission set—
APC extended (2 per year), APC base (1-1/2 per year),
or von Braun (1 per year)—that appears most appro-
priate to describe our planetary exploration program
in the time period 1983-2000.
(b) Seek a judgment on the effective discount rate that
should be used for NASA planning.
(3) If the size of mission set (2a) is larger than the
von Braun mission set, or if the effective discount
rate (2b) is less than 5%, NASA should try to rein-
state a thermionic reactor development program leading
to an operational nuclear electric propulsion system.
(4) Since the same conditions under which nuclear electric
propulsion is economically justified also favor the higher
power level reactor (240 kWe), any resumption of thermionic
reactor development should probably focus on a larger re-
actor.
* '
Multiple tug direct escape combinations with a 120 kWe NEP system may
be even more attractive (see Figure 3.4 and Section 5.1).
(5) NASA should perform a decision analysis on problem
areas where uncertainty and risk are the crucial
program difficulties. The potential for cost savings
through a uniform and consistent risk attitude in
space program management is extremely great.*
*
See Appendix A for a discussion of how probabilities, values, and costs
can be integrated to provide a comprehensive treatment of risk attitude
in space program planning.
II INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STRUCTURING
2.1 Decision Analysis
Decision analysis1' has been primarily applied to problems charac-
terized by uniqueness, complexity, and uncertainty. Space program plan-
ning faces all of these elements in an environment where the results are
usually achieved far in the future and are difficult to evaluate. Never-
theless, significant expenditures continue to be allocated in pursuit of
these objectives. In times of tight budgets, when a number of potentially
desirable technologies or missions or both are competing for shares of
diminishing total resources, it becomes increasingly important to manage
the resources of organizations like NASA in a logical and consistent way.
Decision analysis facilitates effective resource management, aiding the
intuitive procedures of decision-makers by logically combining their value
and preference judgments with information and alternatives from the organi-
zation's experts.
This synthesis is graphically depicted in Figure 2.1. Note that the
aim of decision analysis is not to supplant the decision-maker, but to
amplify his insight into numerous complicated and uncertain alternatives,
to increase his ability to explain the basis for decisions to others in
the management hierarchy, and to improve the organization's total port-
folio of projects by providing a comprehensive discipline for management
decision-making.
A decision analysis is usually carried out in three phases—
deterministic, probabilistic, and informational—as shown in Figure 2.2.
The deterministic phase consists of structural modeling and value model-
ing to formulate criteria for selecting the most appropriate decision
if the ultimate value of all the relevant system variables were known.
In this phase, sensitivity analysis is used extensively to measure the
importance of the system variables. In the probabilistic phase, expert
judgment on the uncertainty in the value of the most important system
variables is encoded and the most appropriate decision is reexamined in
light of the risks present in the project, given management's attitude
toward risk. Finally, in the informational phase, the economic value
of eliminating the uncertainty in these crucial variables is measured
and compared with the costs of realistic information-gathering programs
like construction of pilot facilities or prototypes. One benefit of
SOURCE OF "WHAT YOU WANT"
VALUES
TIME PREFERENCE
RISK ATTITUDE
INFORMATION
^ALTERNATIVES
PROBLEMS
.OPPORTUNITIES
DECISION ANALYSIS
ENCODING OF:"WHAT YOU WANT'
"WHAT YOU KNOW'
MODEL BUILDING
ANALYSIS THAT LEADS
TO DECISION
POLICIES
DIRECTION
SETTING
DECISIONS
IDENTIFICATION
OF VARIABLES
PROBABILITY
ASSIGNMENTS
MODEL
RELATIONSHIPS
SOURCE OF "WHAT YOU KNOW"
FIGURE 2.1 DECISION ANALYSIS SYNTHESIS
PRIOR ,
INFORMATION1
DETERMINISTIC
PHASE
PROBABILISTIC
PHASE
INFORMATIONAL
PHASE
DECISION
NEW
INFORMATION INFORMATION
GATHERING
GATHER NEW
INFORMATION
ACT
FIGURE 2.2 THE DECISION ANALYSIS CYCLE
this sequential approach is that the analyst is continually monitoring
the value of i
the analysis.
e  additional modeling before proceeding to a new phase of
The first application of decision analysis to space program planning
evaluated various strategies for the unmanned exploration of Mars. This
work, carried out by SRI in the mid-1960s under contract to General
Electric, analyzed the highly sequential problem of which experimental
configurations to launch at successive launch opportunities and explicity
incorporated the uncertainty and value aspects of the problem into a
decision-tree format. The analysis was conducted first at the pilot
level to prove the value of techniques and to gain insight into a sim-
plified version of the problem. It was then expanded to a much more
detailed and realistic full-scale analysis.5 Since that time, decision
analysis has been applied to a number of other difficult public policy
problems, including the nuclear expansion of Mexico's electrical power
system,6 hurricane seeding policy, and wildland fire protection. A
knowledge of this background of the SRI Decision Analysis Group led to
the preliminary discussions from which this project evolved.
2.2 Problem Definition
In our earliest meetings with JPL personnel from the Propulsion
Division, a decision problem emerged that was truly difficult. The prob-
lem was unique, concerning a type of propulsion that had never been used.9
It was important in terms of both the resources currently required for
research and development and the ambitious missions and advanced explora-
tion strategies that it would facilitate. The development process was
complex, including a new process for generating electricity inside a
nuclear reactor, and the development results were highly uncertain. The
payoff—an operational nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system—was at
least ten years away, but would be one of the most highly capable advanced
propulsion systems available during the last 15 years of this century and
perhaps longer. Finally, as in many government problems, the decision-
maker (or decision-making body) was difficult to identify; the values of
achieving and successfully using an NEP system were unclear; and the
preferences of the decision-maker regarding the timing of outcomes, the
risks in the project, and the priority of space exploration vis a vis
other pressing public problems were not clearly defined.
One of the most effective ways to proceed in such a complicated and
unstructured situation is to focus on a specific decision and then estab-
lish boundaries for the problem by simplifying or eliminating aspects of
the actual situation that do not affect the decision. For this purpose,
a decision is defined as an essentially irrevocable allocation of re-
sources. The resources may be money, facilities, or manpower, but a
decision implies a specific choice among alternative allocations. Thus,
the identification of feasible alternatives is essential at this stage
of the problem.
The Propulsion Research and Advanced Concepts group at JPL origi-
nally viewed their 'decision" as defining propulsion system requirements
that would control, albeit indirectly, the development of the thermionic
reactor.10"13 The reactor was considered to be the critical technology
element of the NEP system. The decision analysis team countered that the
problem should be approached at the pilot level and oriented toward a
single rational decision-maker considering a well-defined decision among
14
specific alternatives. It was argued that the insights gained would
adequately compensate for whatever simplifying assumptions had to be
made.
To allocate resources in a rational and consistent manner,
real alternatives must be identified. Identification of actual decisions
and alternatives allows a careful separation of those factors that are
under our control (decision variables) from those factors that are 'deter-
mined by the external environment (state variables). It further allows
us to model the logical relationships connecting the decision and state
variables of the problem to the subsequent events (outcomes) that deter-
mine the ultimate desirability of selecting various alternatives.
The hierarchy of decisions in the development of thermionic reactors
for nuclear electronic propulsion is illustrated in Figure 2.3. Early in
the project, the client team at JPL specified that the focus of analysis
should be at the level of thermionic reactor development decisions. Such
decisions might'include alternative thermionic fuel elements (TFE) designs
as well as power level decisions for the overall reactor. Among other
things, this specification reflected the fact that a very large study
(APC) was already under way to compare the various advanced propulsion
*
The APC study combined the economic analysis capabilities of Mathematica
with the planetary mission analysis work of JPL and the geocentric mission
analysis of Lockheed Missiles and Space Company. This study began before
the decision analysis, proceeded concurrently, and is still continuing.
The overlap is less than might be imagined. The APC study has under-
taken a very detailed equal capability economic analysis, trying to
determine whether future cost savings are sufficient to justify the
development of advanced propulsion systems, and, if so, which ones.
The decision analysis in the study reported here used APC data—at the
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systems—chemical tug, nuclear rocket, solar electric, and nuclear elec-
tric. With our analysis focused on thermionic reactor decisions, prob-
lems at other levels of the hierarchy had only to be treated with regard
to their impact on the primary decision.
Decisions on thermionic reactor development .influence the course,
and hence the outcomes, of the thermionic R&D program, as shown in
Figure 2.4. The R&D outcomes—TFE lifetime and reactor specific weight,
power, and cost—influence the subsequent uses of the thermionic reactor
for NEP missions and other applications. Furthermore, the date that
an operational NEP flight system becomes available affects certain NEP
specific missions like a Halley's comet rendezvous. The choice of mis-
sion strategy for the time period 1980-2000 is reflected in various
mission models. NEP will then be selected for missions if it is com-
petitive in cost and performance with other propulsion systems given the
requirements of the various missions and alternative ways to accomplish
them. This then generates mission accomplishments, which are trans-
formed in the value model into mission values. Mission values combined
with mission costs emerge from the model as an equivalent profit flow
over time. Finally, the time preference model reduces this flow to a
single .measure of worth, the net present equivalent profit. (These
concepts are explored in detail in Section 3.1)
The present equivalent profit is more valuable as a measure of the
differential value due to changes in TFE specifications or thermionic
reactor design than it is as an absolute measure of "national profit."
This is because at the pilot level only representative mission sets and
value scales have been used, which, while probably adequate to evaluate
R&D decisions, may be inadequate for other decisions. Although the pilot
value model is an explicit structure that allows a rational and" consistent
comparison of R&D alternatives, it is not necessarily proposed as appro-
priate for other space exploration questions. Section 3.5 discusses the
need for a "national profit" measure and Chapter 4 makes a thorough exami-
nation of the value models needed to obtain such a measure.
To obtain information on the thermionic program, the decision analy-
sis team participated in the Thermionic Specialists Conference held at
Gulf Energy and Environmental Systems (GEES), September 18-22, 1972.
lowest useful level of detail—to analyze the relative merit of specific
NEP development alternatives, but incorporated an explicit value struc-
ture and other logical features which the APC study did not employ.
Reference 15 is the standard source for APC data.
12
O c/J
U- >
I 5
3 •= 5a in 5
LU O U,
LU
U
HI 01 J
5 CC 0
cc
a.
jjj
I
a
s
Q
O UJ TZ H
CO *£
5 LCC Q Q. LU
<
 z O QLU I :j o
!S "; s
o: >;
Q
1-
Q
CC
•
LU
U.
I-
O
G
LJJ
Q
O
O
C/5
O
UJ
Q
Q.
O
111
Q
a.
LU
UJ
DC
LJJ
O
O.
UJ
o
O
O
LU
CC
13
During this: week, experts from eight different laboratories were inter-
viewed to obtain their opinions on TFE development, future TFE lifetimes,
thermionic reactor applications, and crucial thermionic program decisions.*
Although these discussions yielded valuable information about the tech-
nical aspects of TFE development, it became clear that different labora-
tories had very different views about crucial program decisions.
Decision analysis seeks to evaluate and choose among specific
alternatives—whether they are alternative TFE designs, alternative
NEP power levels, or alternative space exploration strategies. Figure 2.5
shows a wide range of research and technology development alternatives
that were mentioned in our discussions with various thermionic special-
ists. Those concerned with TFE production and testing saw all the de-
cision points shown in Figure 2.5 as behind them and looked forward to
such decisions as whether to proceed with the thermionic reactor experi-
ment (TREX). Others working in thermionic research felt that the ulti-
mate decision would be to move from in-core thermionics to out-of-core
thermionics. Still others in program management did not see any real
alternatives within the jurisdiction of the Space Nuclear Systems Office
(SNSO), presaging the type of higher level decision that eventually cur-
tailed the U.S. thermionic program. But from the vantage point of the
thermionic reactor systems project team at JPL, the decision of greatest
concern was to select the reactor with "optimal" power level and per-
formance characteristics for planetary exploration.
Thus, one of the initial goals proposed for the decision analysis
was to establish specifications for the optimal TFE. These specifica-
tions, however, were generally divorced from the inseparable considera-
tions of cost and feasible engineering design. To evaluate a TFE design,
the expected TFE performance parameters—mass, power, and lifetime—must
exist, as well as an engineering design considered capable of producing
a TFE with that performance at some associated cost. These TFE param-
eters must then be translated into a specific mass, lifetime, and cost
for the thermionic' reactor and nuclear electric propulsion system.
Finally, the effects of performance improvement or degradation measured
in terms of missions achievable and trip time can be compared with the
increased or decreased unit and development cost of the propulsion
system.
*
It should be reiterated that a decision is a choice among different
feasible alternative allocations of program resources.
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In our discussions with thermionic specialists, it became clear that
few alternative TFE designs were under serious consideration. In addi-
tion to the reference design (F series), there were the advanced design
(G series) being studied at Thermo Electron Corporation and various vague
"hunches" regarding specifications that approached the Russian design
(small diameter) or the French design (low cost). Engineers at JPL had
also examined a design for an externally fueled TFE, but the great pro-
portion of the program resources were devoted to the internally fueled
reference design TFE. Hence it was natural to examine this design as a
first case. The reference TFE was considered suitable for either the
120 kWe or 240 kWe power level reactors. Furthermore, the interaction
of power level with mission capabilities was a primary concern of the
user-oriented community at JPL. The initial analysis was focused
therefore, on the power level decision in the context of the reference
TFE design.
2.3 Pilot Level Problem Structure
Figure 2.6 shows the conceptual structure needed to evaluate NEP
development alternatives. This diagram emphasizes the sequential nature
of the intermediate decisions and outcomes that must be considered to
connect current NEP development decisions with the ultimate program out-
comes. Thus, although Figure 2.6 is a companion to Figure 2.4, it dis-
plays the sequence of program decisions and resolutions of uncertainty
that are implicit in Figure 2.4.
The squares in Figure 2.6 represent NASA decisions and the circles
represent the resolution of uncertainty. Each of the fan-shaped forms
represents the range of possible outcomes that is thought to encompass
the ultimate actual outcome which will occur at some point in the future.
Another way to view the "fans" is as representing the data required to
evaluate the initial development decision. In the deterministic phase
analysis discussed in Chapter III, a best-guess estimate (or expected
value) has replaced the probability distribution implied by each fan,
with the majority of data coming from experts at JPL, GEES, and NASA
Ames. Wherever possible, data consistent with the concurrent APC study
have been used.
The first decision to be made is the level of power that the NEP
system should have; this decision would lead to a determination of the
cost, specific weight, and operating lifetime of the system. Depending
on these results and the capabilities of other advanced propulsion
systems, a planetary exploration strategy will be adopted that deter-
mines such factors as modularity, compatibility, and inheritance for
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the overall planetary exploration program. Its goals are significantly
reduced cost and enhanced accomplishments. Different exploration strate-
gies will result in different spacecraft (S/C) weight and costs. Finally,
on a mission-by-mission basis, the most effective propulsion system avail-
able will be selected to perform that mission. The outcomes of these
missions enter a valuation model that converts scientific findings at
various targets to a dollar value (under several sets of assumptions)
and subtracts mission cost to produce a total program profit. This
structure is generally used for .evaluating the NEP development strategy
that yields the highest total program profit.
Preliminary findings from the APC study had indicated that the
differential benefits from different propulsion technologies used to
perform identical missions were very small compared with the total mis-
sion costs and, thus, were not very conclusive for the development strategy
decisions shown in the leftmost box of Figure 2.6. A much clearer picture
in terms of differential program cost and thus, profit, emerges from con-
sidering the role of advanced propulsion systems in the development of
new, more effective planetary exploration strategies. The current design
concept of individual mission-dependent spacecraft places great emphasis
on minimum weight and maximum reliability. In this report, this tradi-
tional spacecraft design philosophy is referred to interchangeably as
"the individual mission dependent" or "the nominal" exploration strategy.
This strategy can be modified in several ways, but most of these
modifications require higher mission payloads or mission energies. Among
these strategies requiring higher payloads are the multimission modular
spacecraft philosophy1 —shown in Figure 2.7—and the uniform science
outer planet explorer.* Among those strategies requiring higher energies
are those utilized for multitarget missions.^ These alternatives are
represented in Figure 2.6 by the box labeled "planetary exploration
strategy." Such advanced mission concepts were under study at JPL
The APC study dismissed a "standardized spacecraft" as not currently
possible for planetary missions, but this dismissal may have resulted
from the mandate of that study to compare four different propulsion
systems. For chemical tug and solar electric propulsion, this con-
cept would indeed have been too demanding, whereas many thermionic
experts felt that the power and propulsion capabilities of nuclear
electric propulsion would enable the development of such a space-
craft.
t
Private communication, J. W. Stearns and R. W. Schaupp. See also the
APC Phase II Reports, April 1973.
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during the course of the decision analysis, and our analysis was designed /
to incorporate them as they became available. However, only data for
the nominal and the multimission modular spacecraft concept illustrated
in Figure 2.7 were available at the time of this analysis. This alter-
native spacecraft design concept is designated, as either 'multimission
modular" or "low-cost" in this report.
Finally, the box labeled "propulsion system selection strategy" repre-
sents the last principal decision of the program--namely which of the vari-
ous available propulsion systems should be selected to fly each mission. A
propulsion system selector has been.designed to consider any savings in
spacecraft power, target capture propulsion, shuttle launches, and flight
time, as well as any reduced risk of failure or enhanced science capabil-
ity, which could be attributed to various propulsion systems.* This pro-
cedure, which is explained in detail in Chapter III, is more comprehen-
sive in its selection criteria than other algorithms that we have seen
and furthermore applies equally well to all of the advanced propulsion
technologies considered in the APC study.
*
The two latter items—reduced risk and enhanced science—have not been
implemented at this stage of the analysis.
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Ill DETERMINISTIC ANALYSIS
3.1 Deterministic Phase Model Sequence
Before describing the specific deterministic model developed for
this analysis, it will be helpful to review the process of modeling in
a very general context, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Modeling is the
process of representing the various relationships of a problem in formal,
mathematical terms. The first step in modeling is to establish limits
for the decision: that is, to specify precisely just what decision must
be made. This step requires listing in detail the perceived alternatives.
The next step is to specify the various outcomes that each alterna-
tive could produce. These outcomes are the subsequent events that will
determine the ultimate desirability of having chosen an alternative. In
a new product introduction, for example, the outcomes might be specified
by sales levels and costs of production or, more simply, by yearly prof-
its. Thus, there is a certain amount of arbitrariness in defining an
outcome. For decision analysis, an outcome is whatever the decision-
maker would like to know in retrospect to evaluate how the problem
evolved. In a space exploration problem, the outcome could be a com-
plicated list of missions, achievements, and expenditures; in a medical
problem, it could be as simple as whether or not the patient recovered.
Once the outcomes are specified, the system variables for the analy-
sis must be selected--that is, all the variables on which the outcomes
depend. Typically,outcome variables are difficult to predict. Some in-
sight can be gained, however, by relating the outcome variables to other
factors that are easier to comprehend. For example, a manufacturer might
wish to project the sales level of a new product or, in lieu of this, to
relate sales to his own price and quality and the competitors' price and
quality—factors that might be regarded as more accessible. These fac-
tors would then become system variables in the analysis.
The selection of system variables is therefore a process of succes-
sive refinement, wherein the generation of new system variables is cur- .
tailed by considering the importance of the problem and the contributions
of the variables. Clearly, the allocation of the total NASA budget can
economically justify the use of many system variables.
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Once the system variables of the problem have been established,
each must be identified either as a variable under the decision-maker's
control or as a variable determined by the environment of the problem.
System variables that are under the decision-maker's control are called
decision variables. The selection of an alternative in a decision prob-
lem is really the specification of the setting of the decision variables.
System variables that are determined by the environment are known as
state variables. Although state variables may have a distinct effect on
the outcomes, they are autonomous, beyond the control of the decision-
maker. For example, in a new product introduction, the cost of a crucial
raw material or the competitor's advertising level might be state vari-
ables.
Modeling will be used to examine the effect of fluctuations in all
system variables—whether decision variables or state variables. To aid
in this task, the decision-maker or his representative must specify a
nominal value and a range of values for each system variable. In the
case of a decision variable, the nominal value and range are.determined
by the decision-maker's preconceptions regarding the interesting alterna-
tives. In the case of state variables, the nominal value and range re-
flect the uncertainty assigned to the variables. For convenience, the
nominal value of a state variable can be considered as its expected value
in the mathematical sense and the range as the 10th percentile and 90th
percentile points of its probability distribution.
The analyst must next specify the relationships among the system
variables. That is the heart of the modeling process: creating a struc-
.tural model that captures the essential interdependencies of the problem.'
This model should be expressed in the language of logic—mathematics—
typically by a set of equations relating the system variables to the out-
comes. In most decisions, these equations will form the basis for a com-
puter program to represent the model. An ability ••to make pragmatic
engineering judgments is helpful at this stage.
The decision-maker must next assign values to outcomes. Just as it
is difficult to define outcomes, there may be questions about the distinc-
tion between an outcome and its value. For example, in a business prob-
lem, the decision-maker may think of his future profit as both the outcome
and the value associated with it. However, a distinction must be made be-
tween the two. In a public policy evaluation program, the outcome may
consist of a diverse set of attributes such as cost, safety, reliability,
and pollution. These attributes must then be integrated in the value
model into a single value measure that reflects the worth of the particu-
lar outcome to the nation.
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Although in some cases the decision can be reached as a result of
simply ordering outcomes in terms of desirability, most" problems of prac-
tical interest require a numerical (cardinal) ranking system. Therefore,
assigning a value means assigning a numerical value to an outcome. Al-
though there may be many components of value in the outcome, the final
value assignment is a single number associated with that outcome.
In commercial situations, the net value assigned to an outcome will
typically be some form of profit. In social and space problems, however,
the value problem is more complex because of the difficulty in assigning
a dollar value to their less tangible outcomes. Often, however, as in
the Voyager analysis, ' a simple model may prove to be sufficient through
sensitivity analysis. Although these questions of evaluation may be dif-
ficult, logic demands that they be approached directly, and in monetary
terms if monetary resources are to be allocated.
The final step in creating the deterministic model is to specify the
time preference of the decision-maker. Time preference is the term used
to describe the human phenomenon of impatience. Everyone wants good things
to happen to him sooner rather than later. This impatience is reflected
in a willingness to consume less now rather than to invest in the future
~\ R
and postpone the consumption. The payment of interest on savings ac-
counts and the collection of interest on loans are reflections of this
phenomenon. Consequently, representing the desires of a decision-maker
requires a realistic mechanism for describing his time preference, a mech-
anism that reduces any time stream of value to a single number called
present equivalent worth. Present equivalent worth will often be simply
the discounted difference between future income and expenditures using an
interest rate that depends on the relationship of the organization to its
financial environment.19
The modeling part of the deterministic phase thus progresses from
the original statement of the decision problem to a formal description
suitable for detailed examination by logical and computational analysis.
The decision-maker's value assignments and his time preference permit
transforming any time stream of outcomes first to a set of values in
time and then to a present equivalent worth.
3.2 Deterministic Model
The deterministic model constructed in this analysis exists in the
form of a computer program.* Its basic structural relationships are
*
This program, has been given to JPL. Contact Alan Nakashima for informa-
tion.
24
shown in Figure 3.2. It should be emphasized that because of the termi-
nation of the analysis in mid-course, the data and, to a lesser degree,
the program structure should be considered as preliminary. Chapter VI
discusses some of the modifications and improvements that would have
been carried out if the decision analysis had been completed; these mod-
ifications and improvements can be implemented by JPL.
ALTERNATIVE
AVAILABLE
PROP. SYSTEMS
ALTERNATIVE
NEP POWER
LEVELS
NEP SYSTEM
PERFORMANCE
PRESENT
EQUIVALENT
WORTH
P/S DEPENDENT AND
INDEPENDENT COST
AND PERFORMANCE DATA
PLANETARY
EXPLORATION
STRATEGY
FIGURE 3.2 LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF DETERMINISTIC MODEL
The logical relationships contained in the structural model include
the capability: (1) to change NEP flight times as a function of changes
in NEP specific weight, (2) to run with discounting, (3) to modify the
strategy and mission set, and (4) to select (in a very general way) the
optimal propulsion system for each mission. Thus, the program allows
analysis of various alternatives at each of the decision levels shown
in Figure 2.6.
The alternatives available to the model are (1) the NEP power level,
(2) the available competitive propulsion options, and (3) the choice of
individual mission-dependent or multimission modular spacecraft designs,
as specified in Section 2.3. Data are stored in the program for missions
2-22 in Table 3.1 for each of these spacecraft design philosophies. Ad-
ditional data that must be supplied include the exact missions to launch,
launch dates, discount and inflation rates, any annual development fund-
ing constraint, and the space shuttle flight cost. For ease of perform-
ing sensitivity analysis, the ability to modify reactor cost or specific
25
Table 3.1
REPRESENTATIVE PLANETARY EXPLORATION MISSION SETS
1.
2.
3.
4.
' 5.
6.
7.
8.
9
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
(Geocentric Payload Placement)
Encke Rendezvous
Venus Radar Mapper
Mars Semi-Autonomous Rover
Mercury Orbiter
Saturn Orbiter/Probe
Asteroid Rendezvous (VESTA)
Halley Flyby
Jupiter Orbiter
U/N (Uranus Probe)
Uranus Orbiter/Probe
Venus Large Lander
Neptune Orbiter/Probe
Jupiter/Pluto Flyby
Ganymede Orbiter/Lander
Mars Surface Sample Return
Halley Rendezvous
S/U/N (Uranus Probe)
0.1 AU Solar Probe
Saturn Rings Probe
Ceres Surface Sample Return
Phobos/Deimos Surface Sample Return
APC
EXT
—
83
83
84
84
84
85
85
85
86
87
89
89
90
90
90
83
84
85
88
93
94
APC
Base
--
83
83
84
84
84
85
85
85
86
87
89
89
90
90
90
Von
Braun
—
84
84
86
87,
90
89
—
87
86
*
89
*
*
*
*
--
*
*
*
*
The von Braun Model does not identify missions beyond 1990; missions
noted by an asterisk are not necessarily excluded, but would not be
performed before 1991.
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weight is incorporated explicitly. Finally, all missions can be assigned
equal value,* or any relative value scale can be assigned.
At the present stage of deterministic model development, flight times
are stored directly for each propulsion system and each mission. Separate
flight times are stored corresponding to the payloads required to perform
the missions in the individual mission-dependent and multimission modular
exploration strategies. These flight times have been computed from pay-
load versus flight time curves such as that shown in Figure 3.3. Assume,
for the purpose of illustration, that the payload required to perform
this mission with an individual mission-dependent design is 1000 kg (for
science, guidance, and spacecraft support). Typically, for missions stud-
ied (not employing rovers or landers), the payload required in the multi-
mission modular design strategy is double that for the mission-dependent
design or 2000 kg. Using the curves in Figure 3.3 to translate payloads
into flight times for NEP systems of different power levels and maximum
NEP thrust times (i.e., reactor lifetimes), the data in Table 3.2 have
been derived. It appears that for the lower payload level the difference
in trip time resulting from different power levels or lifetime constraints
is very small. For the higher payload, both the power level and reactor
lifetime constraints can be important. They would be even more so if the
risk reduction implications of reduced trip time were incorporated.
Table 3.2
EFFECTS OF NEP- POWER LEVEL AND THRUST TIME CONSTRAINT
ON FLIGHT TIME AT DIFFERENT PAYLOAD LEVELS
Cent/100 kw (200,000 hours)
Cent/100 kw (unconstrained)
250 kw (20,000 hours)
250 kw (unconstrained)
1000 kg
(years)
4.1
4.0
3.7
3.7
2000 kg
(years)
7.0
5.6
4.3
4.2
Source: Figure 3.3.
Thus, the model can be run as a pure cost model by setting all mission
values at zero.
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The program data have been obtained in this way for missions 2-22
using the nominal and the low-cost design science payloads and the pay-
load versus trip time curves from the APC study. The payload amounts,
especially as they relate to NEP, were obtained from the JPL thermionic
project team, and the performance curves for various propulsion .systems
were taken from the APC study. The effects of changes in reactor
specific weight, a, have been computed using the slopes of these curves,
dm/dt, at the appropriate payload amounts. So four data elements are
stored at present for each mission to describe the performance of each
NEP power level : the flight time and the slope for each of the two pay-
load levels representing the two design strategies.
A more flexible-format, especially for NEP, would be to represent
the performance curves shown in Figure 3.3 by a function of the form:
/ TMAX -
M(t) = MAX 1 - \TMAX—n- TO/ J
where MAX represents the maximum deliverable payload, TMAX is the trip
time needed to deliver MAX, and TO is the trip time needed to deliver
zero net payload (i.e., engines and structure only). M(t) and t then
represent the payload and flight time, respectively, and N is a parameter
that determines the degree of curvature. In this form, it would be prac-
tical to simulate the change in MAX resulting from lifetime constraints,
as shown in Figure 3.3, or from different escape stages, as shown in
Figure 3.4.* Although the TFE lifetime constraint is unique to NEP, the
effect of different escape stages modeled in this way could be useful for
chemical tug and solar electric propulsion.
Finally, the missions used for the analysis should be described very
briefly. Data are loaded for all missions in the APC extended mission set
shown in Table 3.1. These missions are discussed in detail in Appendix 1,
Part 7, of the APC study, where scientific instruments, trajectories, and
propulsion performances are all tabulated for each mission. Two subsets
of'this mission set, called the APC base case model and the von Braun
mission model, have also been designated by NASA for planning purposes.
The eventual goal of our deterministic analysis was to use mission 1 as
a code to incorporate geocentric payload placement missions. As a first
*
Although no such analytic solution exists, low-thrust trajectory experts
expressed guarded optimism that such a functional representation could
be achieved empirically. We are indebted to R. W. Schaupp, J. F. Ingber,
and D. J. Spadoni for discussions of this matter.
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approximation, geocentric missions were omitted because they appeared not
to influence the 120/240 kW NEP power level decision.*
The deterministic model shown in Figure 3.2 has been modified slightly
by incorporating the propulsion system selection logic after the value
model. This was done because many people working in the electric pro-
pulsion field felt that an ample supply of power (in the kilowatt range)
should be of benefit to the science experiments and communication require-
ments at the target. Indeed, the RTG power levels discussed in the APC
study for five representative missions are insufficient for the spacecraft
? Tdemands of several missions using TUG or nuclear rocket. On the other
hand, no concrete benefits for the high power supplies have been agreed
upon; thus this potential feature of the propulsion system selector has
not been implemented. Furthermore, the selector can operate, using
discounting to compare propulsion systems. Thus, if a high discount rate
is used, the impact of reduced trip time will be enhanced. A detailed
explanation of the propulsion system selection logic follows in the next
section.
3.3 Propulsion System Selector
Table 3.3 shows how the cost of a mission can be broken down into
factors that are independent of both propulsion system and flight time,
independent of flight time but dependent on propulsion system, and
finally dependent on both flight time and propulsion system. These
groupings, as well as the specific categories shown, emerged from a care-
ful study of JPL's detailed cost estimates for five representative plane-
tary missions.t22 The significance of these groupings can be seen in
Table 3.4.
Note in particular that for these five missions the additional
spacecraft cost when using a chemical tug instead of nuclear electric
propulsion is $93.0 million, $23.2 million, $46.9 million, $85.4 million,
and $77.5 million, respectively. All except the second mission, the Mars
semiautonomous rover, are planned to launch two spacecraft. Note that
for each of these five missions the NEP spacecraft cost is less than the
*
After the conclusion of our work, Dr. E. J. Greenblat of Mathematica
mentioned that the APC study had essentially proved this result (private
communication, March 1973).
We are indebted to Mr. R. L. Whitcomb for discussion of this work.
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Table 3.3
MISSION COST BREAKDOWN
Mission Cost
= Propulsion System Cost + Spacecraft Cost
Spacecraft Cost
= Trip Time Independent, P/S Independent Costs:
Systems integration
Prelaunch project management
Probes
Orbiter science
Landers and lander science
Rovers and rover science
Ascent vehicles
+ Trip Time Independent, P/S Dependent Costs:
RTG power
Dual propulsion
Retro propulsion
(Spacecraft/orbiter development and recurring)
+ Trip Time Dependent (and thus P/S Dependent) Costs
Deep space net flight support
Mission operations in flight
Science instruments and support in flight
Postlaunch project management
corresponding cost for any other propulsion system (except SEP for Encke,
where an extraordinary inheritance from a previous SEP mission has been
assumed) and that in general the costs of SEP, TUG, and NRP are approxi-
mately equal. Furthermore, the differences in spacecraft cost for SEP,
TUG, and NRP are almost exactly accounted for by the difference in flight
time for the different propulsion systems. This situation is illustrated
in Table 3.5, where it is clear that for the TUG, NRP, and SEP the RDT&E,
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Table 3.4
DETAILED COST ESTIMATES FOR FIVE REPRESENTATIVE MISSIONS*
(Millions of Dollars)
NEP SEP TUG NRP
Encke Rendezvous $182.0 $156.6t $275.0 $275.0 93.0
Mars Semi-Autonomous Rover 828.3 852.5 851.5 860.8 23.2
Mars Surface Sample Return 657.0 690.3 703.9 703.9 46.9
Ganymede Orbiter/Lander 441.8 520.8 527.2 519.1 85.4
Uranus/Neptune Flyby/Probe
Probe 49.0 50.0 50.0 49.0 1.0
Spacecraft 156.0 162.0 161.3 160.3 5.3
RTG power - 0 46.0 46.0 46.0 46.0
Science and support 68.0 70.2 70.2 68.3 2.2
Project management 8.5 9.5 9.5 8.7 1.0
Mission operations , 30.5 37.0 41.5 32.5 11.0
DSN flight support 26.0 33.0 37.0 28.0 11.0
Total $338.0 $407.7 $415.5 $392.8 77.5
* ' • '
Individual mission dependent spacecraft exploration strategy.
t
High degree of inheritance assumed.
The A column shows the difference between the TUG column and the NEP
column; thus these figures represent the spacecraft savings which can be
achieved by using NEP. The detailed breakdown of the Uranus/Neptune
Flyby/Probe shows that most of the differences are due to either RTG
power or reduced flight time (mission operations and DSN support). These
observations led to our propulsion system selection logic as illustrated
in Figure 3.5.
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Table 3.5
YEARLY COSTS FOR URANUS-NEPTUNE FLYBY/PROBE MISSION
TUG NRP
Fiscal'
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Spacecraft and Operations Costs
(FY 70 dollars X 106)
RDT&E NRI RI ALDO
11 .7 4.
23.6 10.7 7.
41.0 23.0 7.
40.8 16.5 23.0 8.
34.3 23.6 11.
31.6 13.
4.0 11.
6.
4.
4.
5.
7.
7.
5.
5.
7.
7.
5.
3.
1
5
2
1
1
5
7
1
8
7
2
2
2
4
5
1
2
1
0
Total
15.
41.
71.
88.
69.
45.
15.
6.
4.
4.
5.
7.
7.
5.
5.
7.
7.
5.
3.
8
8
2
4
0
1
7
1
8
7
2
2
2
4
5
1
2
1
0
Fiscal
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Spacecraft and Operations Costs
(FY 70 dollars y 106)
RDT&E NRI RI ALDO
11.7 3.
22.6 10.7 ' 7.
41.0 23.0 7.
39.9 15.3 23.0 8.
32.5 23.6 12.
31.6 13,
4.0 11.
6.
5.
; 7,
7
5,
7,
7
4
9
,3
1
,1
8
.5.
.8
1
.0
.1
.2
.0
,2
. 2
.6
Total
15.
40.
71 .
86.
68.
45.
15.
6.
5.
7.
7.
5.
7.
7
4
6
6
1
3
9
1
8
1
0
.1
.2
, 0
, 2
. 2
.6
Total 187.0 50.2 46 .6 131.7 415.5
NEP
Total 183.3 49.0 46.6 113.9 392.8
SEP
Fiscal
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Spacecraft and Operations Costs
(FY 70 dollars X 106)
RDT&E NRI RI ALDO
10.5 4.
20.6 7.8 4.
41.0 17.2 . 7.
38.0 13.1 15.0 9.
27.4 17.0 13.
: 19.5 15.
3.0 . 10.
5.
5.
6.
6.
5.
6.
6.
1
0
9
0
4
6
8
7
8
6
,6
3
6
.5
Total
14.
32.
66.
75.
57.
35.
13.
5.
5.
6.
6.
5.
6.
6.
6
4
1
1
8
1
8
7
8
.6
6
3
6
.5
Fiscal
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989 .
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
Spacecraft and Operations Costs
(FY 70 dollars X 106)
.RDTSiE NRI ; RI ALDO
12.7 4.
25.6 10.7 7.
41.0 23.0 7.
40.8 16.5 23.7 8.
34.3 23.6 ' 1 1 .
29.6 13.
3.0 11.
'6.
4.
4 .
7.
7.
5.
5.
7,
7.
5.
1
5
2
1
1
5
7
1
8
,7
, 2
2
2
.4
. 2
. 1
. 1
Total
16.
43.
71 .
89.
69.
43.
14.
6.
4 .
4.
7.
7.
5.
5.
7.
7.
5.
8
8
2
1
0
1
7
1'
8
7
2
.2
2
.4
.2
1
1
Total 160.0 38.1 32 .0 107.9 338.0 Total 187.0 50.2 47.3 123.2 407 .7
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NRI, and RI are almost identical, whereas ALDO (Activity Level Dependent
Operation) varies in a way essentially proportional to time-of-flight.
These observations lead to the concept of an effective propulsion
system cost that incorporates all factors that depend on propulsion
system or flight time and a corresponding spacecraft cost that is com-
pletely independent, of propulsion system and flight time. This concept
is illustrated in Figure 3.5. For a simple approximate model, it has
been assumed that only NEP can generate spacecraft savings, that the
magnitude of these savings is $24 million for each mission-dependent
spacecraft launched and $8 million for each multimission modular space-
craft launchedt and that all other propulsion systems have equal space-
craft cost and no spacecraft savings. A typical average annual operating
cost of $6 million per year (see ALDO numbers from 1988 onward in Table
3.5) has been assumed for this analysis.
UNIT COST
+ ESCAPE STAGES
- INHERITANCE
+ EXTRA SHUTTLES
—
SPACECRAFT
SAVINGS
(IF NEP)
OPERATING COST
TRANSIT TIME
x
AVE. COST/YEAR
MULTIPLIED BY NUMBER OF S/C LAUNCHEDj
FIGURE 3.5 PROPULSION SYSTEM SELECTION OPERATION: MINIMIZE EFFECTIVE
PROPULSION SYSTEM COST TO MAXIMIZE MISSION NET PRESENT
EQUIVALENT PROFIT •
RDT&E = research, development, testing and evaluation;
NRI = nonrecurring investment ;
RI = recurring investment.
The figure of $24 million per spacecraft is essentially 1/2 of the
$46 million for RTG power shown in Table 3.4 (for a two spacecraft
mission). The $8 million amount for the multimission modular spacecraft
is the approximate recurring investment for an individual RTG power
supply with no development. We are indebted to Mr. R. L. Whitcomb of
JPL for clarification of these matters.
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A sample calculation of the selector in comparing the effective cost
of NEP and Centaur as propulsion systems for the Uranus-Neptune Flyby/
Probe mission is shown in Table 3.6(a). Even though NEP entails the
purchase of two $31 million thermionic reactor propulsion systems, the
savings generated by providing spacecraft power and reducing trip time
make NEP less costly by more than $34 million.
The selector logic can also penalize (or reward) NEP for a change
in specific mass a. An increase in a will either increase flight time
or make a mission impossible (with the desired payload). The calcula-
tions are simple since the extra propulsion system mass can be treated
like additional payload. Thus, small changes about the nominal ot will
be directly proportional to changes in operating cost resulting from
changes in flight time. This calculation is shown in Table 3.6(b).
Since the actual performance curves are convex, as shown in Figures 3.3
and 3.4, a linear approximation overemphasizes the importance of changes
in a. Therefore, the analyst must be careful not to use the linear
approximation for changes so large that the tangent will differ signifi-
cantly from the actual curves on changes that would make the mission
impossible.
Discounting introduces another very subtle effecrt into the selection
process. It has been stated, and will be discussed at length in Chapter
IV, that the selection of alternatives must be based on optimizing the
net present equivalent profit and not merely on minimizing costs. Once
values have been assigned to outcomes, we naturally desire to obtain
these values earlier rather than later. Discounting is a mathematical
expression of our desire to defer expenditures -and to accelerate receipts.
If we wish to express this attitude by discounting costs, we must simul-
taneously discount values as well. A failure to do this can generate
anomalies and even incorrect decisions, as discussed in Chapter IV:
To demonstrate how the selector deals with this effect, consider
two propulsion systems which, if they are launched simultaneously, will
arrive at their target after times T and T . Further, let us assume
that a discount factor DF = (1+D)~1 is being used (in an inflation free
economy). Then if V(>0) is the value of accomplishing this mission, the
present values achieved by the two arrival times are :
T" • rr\
V = V*DF l and V = V*DF 2.
1 2
It follows that:
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Av =. v -v = -v * i - —
= -V * (1-DF 2 1)
= -V*DFTl * (1-DFT2 ~
When DF is less than unity, the usual case for discounting. T < T
To-T-, T T 2 1implies 1-DF 2 1 < 0, while T > T implies l-DF1^"1! > 0. Thus, for
decreased trip times (T2 < T ), that value is increased (¥„ > V^), whereas
for increased trip time (T0 > T.) that value is decreased, V < V . The4 i 2 1
equation above has been used to incorporate the value reduction resulting
from slower trip times into the propulsion system selector logic. In all
cases, the flight time for each propulsion system is compared with that
for a "reference" propulsion system to measure the value effects of
timing. In this way, ^the model selects the propulsion system yielding
the highest net present equivalent profit.
. This effect vanishes when DF = 1—that is, if no discounting is
being used. It also vanishes if the launch times are changed so that the
target arrivals, and hence the values, come at the same time for either
propulsion system or if all mission values are set at zero. in any other
case, the values and the costs must be discounted in an identical fashion.
3.4 Deterministic Phase Analysis
In the deterministic phase, the analysis centers on observing how
changes in the system variables affect worth. Experimentation of this
.type 'is known as sensitivity analysis. It is highly effective in refining
the formulation of the problem and simplifying the deterministic model
structure; see the last step in the deterministic phase shown in Figure
3.1.
The first sensitivity analysis performed is associated with the
decision variables. First, the analyst fixes all the state variables
in the problem at their .nominal values, then allows one of the decision
variables to traverse its assigned range and observes how worth changes.
These observations are usually carried out by computer program. If a
particular decision variable has a major effect, then it was correct to
include it in the original formulation. But if a decision variable has
little or no effect, the analyst is justified in considering removing it
as a decision variable. For example, the time of introducing a new
product might seem to be a decision variable of major importance, but
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because of the combined effects of competitive reaction and the gaining
of production experience, it might have very little effect. The timing
of entry would then be an impotent variable.
Next, sensitivity analyses are performed on the state variables,
which are uncertain and over which the decision-maker has no control.
With all other system variables at their nominal values, the change in
worth is observed while sweeping one state variable over its range. If
a state variable has a major effect, then the uncertainty in the variable
deserves special attention. Such variables are called crucial variables
to emphasize their importance. If, however, varying a state variable
over its range produces only a minor change in worth, then that variable
might well be fixed at its nominal value.
Although sensitivity analysis has been described as if it concerns ,
only changes in one variable at a time, some of the most interesting
sensitivity results are often observed when there are simultaneous changes
in state variables. Since the possibilities of changing state variables
jointly increase rapidly with the number of state variables, it is im-
portant for the decision analyst to determine the amount of simultaneous
sensitivity analysis that is economic. This judgment requires a careful
consideration of the dependencies among the crucial variables.
3.5 Definition of Base Case for Nuclear Electric Propulsion
To establish nominal data for a NEP base case, the decision analysis
team worked very closely with specialists from the thermionic projects
at JPL and GGA. The base case development program specifies a 120 kWe
NEP developed for a 1983 launch, according to the development cost esti-
mate from JPL.23 Alternative development cost streams were provided in
the same document for 120 kW NEP that will be ready in 1986 and 240 kVV
NEP that will be ready in either 1983 or 1986. The base case development
outcomes were a power of 120 kW, a specific mass of 30 kg/kW, a lifetime
of 20,000 hours, and a unit cost of $31.1 million including the avionics
necessary for geocentric guidance and control, with a cost reduction of
10% for all units after the first.
For the 120 kWe 'NEP base case, the Centaur (CENT) was used as a
direct escape stage with a unit cost of $6.0 million, and the cost of one
shuttle flight—considered sufficient for a CENT/NEP(120) launch—was
taken to be $10.5 million. For a first simple development decision
situation the alternatives were to develop 120 kWe NEP or to develop
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nothing using only the Centaur whenever possible. The planetary explora-
tion strategy for the base case was individual mission-dependent, dic-
tating high cost, high reliability, and minimal weight spacecraft. To
examine the full potential of NEP, the entire APC extended mission set
was run for the base case, but in every instance parallel runs have been
made for the APC base missions and the von Braun mission set. Finally,
for base case runs, the discount rates and inflation rates .have been
assumed to be equal, thereby eliminating time preference effects, but
again parallel runs have been made with 10% and 15% discounting and 5%
inflation.
For the base case value model, every mission has been assigned an
equal value of $950 million, a value just large enough so that even the
most costly mission (Mars rover) is profitable. Such a value model is
the most simple extension of a pure cost model, which after all is an
equal value model in which all missions are assigned a value of zero.
Thus, each cost reduction is reflected directly as a profit increase.
But, furthermore, when a mission cannot be accomplished by a particular
propulsion system in some planetary exploration strategy, a model with
values shows both a cost reduction and a profit reduction. Profit is a
more formal and more useful way to represent the "performance degradation
parameter" discussed in the APC study and shown here in Figure 3.6.
Note that if the APC extended missions are assumed to accomplish most of
the scientific and political components of value currently assigned to
planetary exploration, then the equal values of $950 million and the size
of this mission set imply a total assigned value of at least $20 billion
for the entire solar system (exclusive of the moon). Again, this value
is not proposed, but only used to demonstrate the operation and useful-
ness of a value model. Value models are discussed in great detail in
Chapter IV.
Table 3.7 shows the deterministic model output for the base case
defined above. Shuttle costs, propulsion system costs, spacecraft costs,
and operating costs are summed separately over all missions and then com-
bined into a total mission cost. The NEP development cost (reduced by
the cost of the first NEP flight system) is added to the mission cost to
obtain the program cost. Then on a mission-by-mission basis, the follow-
ing data are provided: mission number; propulsion system selected to
*
It has been assumed for the pilot model that Centaur alone always
requires a kick stage at an additional cost of $1 million. This assump-
tion is very favorable to the Centaur since it often needs several
additional retro stages for orbital capture as well.
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perform the mission; the effective propulsion system cost (including
spacecraft savings and value effects when discounting); the difference
between the lowest and the second lowest effective propulsion system cost
(in the table ***** indicates that only one propulsion system can accom-
plish the mission); and finally the value, cost, and profit for each
mission. The bottom line of Table 3.7 shows the total number of missions
accomplished, the number for which NEP was selected, and the total mission
profit. The sensitivity results reported in Section 3.7 summarize a
large number of such cases.
3.6 Variations from the Base Case
The design of the base case for the decision analysis has been
strongly influenced by the focus of the pilot analysis--namely on the
power level decision. The principal variation from the base case discussed
above therefore has been the addition of the 240 kWe GNEP system for com-
parison. For the decision of whether to orient the thermionic program
toward a 120 kWe or a 240 kWe reactor, it has proved important to consider
alternative planetary exploration strategies. These strategies can util-
ize the capabilities of advanced propulsion systems to explore the solar
system more effectively. Since the 240 kWe reactor would be somewhat more
expensive to develop and produce, any savings resulting from reduced flight
time are likely to be insufficient to offset the increased reactor costs.
The real economic and technical advantages of more capable systems result
from the implementation of lower cost or higher capability exploration
strategies such as those shown in Figure 2.6 and discussed in Section 2.3.
Thermionic reactor specialists contend that the reference TFE design
is suitable for both power levels, so lifetime constraints have been
assumed to be the same for either power level. On the other hand, the
specific weight of the reactor is expected to decrease slightly as a func-
tion of power level. Finally, the cost differential between the 120 kWe
and 240 kWe propulsion system (thermionic reactor, radiator, power con-
ditioners, and thrusters) is very close to $10 million. The deterministic
lifetime constraint has been set at 20,000 hours. The nominal specific
weights used have been a(120kWe) = 30 kg/kWe and a(240 kWe) = 25 kg/kWe.
The nominal costs for the two propulsion systems used are $31.1 million
"for the 120 kWe system.and $41.0 million for the 240 kWe. These costs
each include $6.4 million for avionics. Since avionics is not obviously
necessary for planetary missions, a provision has been made to run cases
with or without it. All of these numbers have been obtained from JPL,
reviewed with GGA, and to the best of our knowledge are the same numbers
that have been submitted to the APC study.
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In addition to the runs for 240 kWe GNEP, sensitivities to percentage
variations in NEP specific weight and unit cost have also been examined
at both power levels. Similar variations could not be made for'{lifetime,
since only performance curves for the 20,000 hour assumption had been
provided. If performance data similar to that shown in Figure 3.3 were
available for all APC missions corresponding to TFE lifetimes of 10,000,
15,000, 20,000 and 25,000 hours, then sensitivity runs could be made
*
similar to those made for specific weight.
Our impressions from a number of discussions at JPL and GGA were
that NEP specific weight variation of ± 20% and unit cost variations of
± 10% were reasonable for deterministic sensitivities. It can be seen
that these variations have some significance, which will be examined in
the next section. Opinions among thermionic specialists were divided as
to whether the 20,000-hour lifetime could be achieved, as shown in Figure
3.7. However, it seemed possible to achieve in light of the opinions ex-
pressed regarding the lifetime of a typical Ground Prototype Reactor TFE
about 1980. Furthermore, for most missions where thrust times greater than
15,000 hours are desirable, there is a sizable performance margin that
could probably be used to reoptimize trajectories with reduced thrust
time at the cost of increased trip time.
3.7 Deterministic Sensitivity Analysis of NEP
This section examines the results of a sensitivity analysis to
variations in discount rate, mission set, NEP specific weight, NEP unit
cost, planetary exploration strategy, and NEP power level, all within the
context of an equal mission value model. The results from a relative
model value are discussed briefly in Chapter IV, but even without detailed
analysis it is clear that the profit differentials in the undiscounted
sensitivity tables, which reflect changes in mission costs and values
will be entirely a reflection of cost changes unless missions are lost
because of the changed conditions. That is because none of the variations
examined can influence the deterministic, undiscounted mission values
unless they eliminate the mission entirely. So undiscounted sensitivities
to unit cost and specific weight changes will be identical in either an
equal or a relative value model.
*
Low thrust trajectory experts expressed some optimism that, as with the
effects of specific weight and direct escape stages change discussed
in Section 3.2, there might be a simple way to express such TFE life-
time effects by their effect on the maximum deliverable payload in an
analytic form.
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5000 10,000 15,000
TFE LIFETIME — hours
20,000 25,000
FIGURE 3.7 PRELIMINARY OPINIONS ON LIFETIME OF TYPICAL GROUND
PROTOTYPE REACTOR TFE (CIRCA 1980) FROM PARTICIPANTS
AT THERMIONIC SPECIALISTS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 1972
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, In any program whose benefits will not be realized for ten years or
more in the future, the choice of discount rate is bound to influence sig-
nificantly the outputs from any evaluation procedure. It does not neces-
sarily follow, however, that any decisions should change or even that the
relative importance of any state variables will be altered. These answers
must result from careful analysis. However, it should* be noted that for
effective discount rates of 5% to 10%, a delay of 11 years (i.e., from
1972 to 1983) produces discount factors of about 60% and 35%, respectively.
These factors differ to such a degree that sensitivity tables will be
given separately for different discount rates. The present curtailment
of space thermionic reactor research certainly reflects these severe
reductions of future benefits that will not be achieved for at least ten'
years.
Another factor that strongly affects the total profit magnitude, but
that may or may not strongly affect decisions, is the size and nature of
the mission set that is judged to represent most closely the way the nation
wants its resources for space exploration allocated. To represent this
effect, data will be presented in a parallel way for the three mission
sets defined in Table 3.1. For each of these, Table 3.8 shows the effect
of variations in NEP availability, NEP specific weight, NEP unit cost,
and planetary exploration strategy. The cases are described by their
total program profit, their difference from the base case of nominal space-
craft with Centaur and 120 kWe NEP, and the number of NEP and total mis-
*
sions flown. In all cases, the undiscounted total program profit i.s
considerably more sensitive to a 10% cost reduction in unit cost than to
a 20% reduction in specific weight. The 10% cost reduction also causes
a dramatic increase in the number of missions (all except one) that employ
NEP as their optimal propulsion system.
When only Centaur is available, the total program profit is reduced
in a manner approximately proportional to the fraction of the mission set
that can be accomplished by the Centaur alone. In these equal value
cases (with the discount rate equal to the inflation rate), the reduction
.in profit because of missions not accomplished when NEP is not available
is sufficient to justify the $500 million cost of the NEP development
program. This same comparison will be examined below for more realistic
combinations of discount and inflation rates.
A final observation related to Table 3.8 is the apparent difference
between'mission sets in the multimission modular (low cost) planetary
.*
Effective discount rate is zero, i.e., discount rate equals inflation rate.
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exploration strategy. For the 20-mission set, this strategy increases
total program profit by more than $200 million, whereas for the 9-mission
set it reduces the profit by nearly $400 million. The reason for this
drastic change follows:
In all three mission sets there is one mission, the Venus large
lander, for which 120 kW NEP is incapable of delivering the
heavier, low cost payload (with a Centaur escape stage). The
spacecraft savings resulting from the modularity of the 19
other APC extended missions compensate for the loss of the
profit on the Venus mission, but the savings from the other
8 missions in the von Braun set cannot do so. In this way, the
profit model trades off spacecraft savings against lost mis-
sions and points the way to optimal strategies.
Table 3.9 displays the analogous data for the 240 kW system (GNEP).
In this table, the base case is for the reference design GNEP system
with the multimission modular spacecraft planetary exploration strategy.
For GNEP, the effect of a 20% change in specific weight has decreased
slightly because of the much steeper slopes of the appropriate performance
curves (see Figure 3.4), whereas the effect of a 10% change in cost has
increased since the cost itself is larger. In fact, because of the
decreased number of missions which Centaur can perform, these variations
cause no change in the number of missions that would utilize GNEP.
Furthermore, GNEP used in the individual mission-dependent spacecraft
strategy is clearly less profitable than the 120 kW NEP in the same
strategy and considerably less profitable than the GNEP base case.
Table 3.10 is the analog of Table 3.8, but utilizes an inflation
rate of 5% and a discount rate of 10%, or an effective discount rate of
5% on constant dollars. It can be seen that discounting increases the
number of missions for which NEP is selected in the base case because
of the ability of NEP to save approximately one year of flight time on
missions 2 and 14. This change in selection would not occur if the
mission values were set. at zero. Furthermore, in the discounted cases,
NEP retains all but one of its missions for a 20% increase in specific
weight and all of its missions for a 10% unit cost increase, because of
the significance of delaying accomplishments. By the same reasoning,
an NEP 10% cost reduction gains one less mission than it did without
discounting because it is slower than the Centaur for that mission.
*
See Reference 19, page 3-49.
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In this table, the relative importance of a 20% change in specific
weight compared with a 10% change in cost has changed drastically. As
stated before, values and costs must be discounted in identical ways to
avoid contradictory, and even incorrect, results. Thus, a change in trip
time resulting from a change in NEP specific weight will change the timing
of the mission accomplishments, and thus modify their present value.*
This dramatic change in sensitivities illustrates the'importance of under-
standing the values and time preference issues that underlie our space
exploration activities.
Table 3.10 shows that discounting also emphasizes the inability of
NEP to take full advantage of the low-cost, multimission modular explora-
tion strategy, which GNEP can. This occurs because the Venus large lander,
even with a 1989 launch, has a relatively early payoff (1989) with
relatively late costs (1989). Thus, its profit contribution is emphasized
by discounting. Note that all of our spacecraft costs are assumed to
occur in the launch year.
By performing careful sensitivity analysis, it is possible to evalu-
ate- the effect of reduced unit cost on the present equivalent worth, the
effect of reduced specific weight, and so forth. Since the analysis was
not focused on making specific design decisions, the results from this
type of evaluation will probably not be highly accurate for design pur-
poses. The assumptions that were made in the pilot level analysis were
justified on the basis that they would not affect the general direction
of the NEP program, particularly the power level decision. These same
assumptions may affect design trade-off decisions to a much greater degree.
Thus, caution should be employed if applying the deterministic model to
determine specific design trade-offs.
*
The APC economic analysis incorporates the same effect by stipulating
that launch dates will be adjusted to equalize the target arrival times
~of all propulsion candidates. This effectively reduces the mission costs
of more capable propulsion systems through discounting.
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IV VALUE MODELING IN SPACE PROGRAM PLANNING
A great number of studies have examined the problem of explicit
value models for space program planning.5'25'26 Although these studies
were interesting, imaginative, and logically sound, they have apparently
never been applied by top NASA management to the basic planning process.
A quotation from Reference 25 shows the usual attitude with which such
models are regarded: "These values ... should be regarded only as illus-
trative, however, since we had been requested by NASA not to attempt to
obtain a 'final' set of values by interviewing a large number of experts
or scientists not associated with the study."27 There is a widespread
uneasiness among decision-makers in the government concerning the use
and misuse of explicit value models. '
In discussions with NASA management regarding this issue, the stan-
dard reply has been that the Scientific Advisory Boards do make cost-
effective decisions when there is not enough money to pursue optimal
programs. They do so implicitly, however, in a manner that cannot be
checked and cannot be clearly communicated to other parts of the organi-
zation, where related decisions on coordinated programs are being made
by others. Several recent reports of the Space Science Board28'29 giving
recommendations for high-level, intermediate-level, and low-level programs
provide a good example of such implicit value judgments.
In this chapter we will explore explicit value systems in detail to
see exactly what advantages they offer, how they may be obtained, and
how they might be applied in the evaluation of advanced propulsion alter-
natives. One of the primary problems with explicit value systems should
be mentioned at the onset—namely, that value judgments are hierarchical,
just as decisions are (see Figure 2.3). A common objection to explicit
value models is that "... you can never get an expert on Jupiter and an
expert on Mars to agree on the relative value of Jupiter and Mars." This
statement no doubt is true, but a panel of broadly-based exobiologists,
planetary astronomers, and planetary geologists probably could make such
judgments, at least with regard to their special areas. If these various
groups disagreed, then a higher level judgment would be needed to estab-
lish relative priorities among exobiology, planetary astronomy, and extra-
terrestrial geology in the context of our total space program. In this
way, many of the objections to explicit value assignment translate into
requests for a well-defined management decision-making hierarchy.
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In summary, an explicit value system provides rules for resource
allocation that are easy to communicate and can be applied consistently
at all stages of a project, as well as among projects. An explicit value
system is not a set of moral or theological judgments on intrinsic merit.
It is an expression of how we desire to allocate limited resources. Thus,
it will, and should, change in response to changes in the technical, eco-
nomic, and political climate of the larger system that it represents.
4.1 Nature of Value
The application of logic to the decisions involved in space program
planning requires, as one of its fundamental steps, the construction of
a value function on possible program outcomes. That is, it is necessary
to construct a scale of values that specifies the preferences of the
decision-maker for one outcome as opposed to another. The problem is
analogous to the one we face if we delegate someone to buy a car for us:
we must tell him which features of a car are important to us and to what
extent. How do we value performance relative to comfort, appearance
relative to economy of operation, and so forth? The need for specify-
ing the value function grows out of the desire to utilize the potential
of analytical and logical methods to extend and improve our more intuitive
concepts, as well as the desire to delegate many of the detailed decisions
to lower-level decision-makers. Analytical and logical methods allow us
to take direct account of many more factors, including the dimension of
uncertainty, to make better decisions. To obtain maximum benefit from
these methods, however, we must be willing to specify a value function,
especially in a complex sequential decision situation such as planetary
exploration.
4.2 Derived and Assigned Values
*
In constructing the value function, careful distinction must be
drawn between derived and assigned components of value. The assigned
component of value is obtained as an explicit benefit of the project.
For example, conducting a life experiment on Mars has an assigned scien-
tific value that is very high. Similarly, placing a spacecraft in orbit
around Mars has an assigned value as an engineering accomplishment. How-
ever, placing the spacecraft in orbit also has a derived value because
*
These will be illustrated using examples of Martian exploration drawn
from the Voyager analysis.
54
of its importance in achieving later assigned values, like the conduct
of life detection experiments. A derived value component therefore is
one that accrues to an accomplishment because of its contribution to
achieving future assigned values. If a project is terminated at some
date, it will be credited with all of the assigned values it had achieved
prior to that date, but not with any derived values that had not yet been
realized in assigned form. These values could only be realized by con-
tinuation of the project.
The same accomplishment may have both assigned and derived values.
The assigned values are determined by factors outside the project; the
derived values stem from the assigned values and the probabilistic struc-
ture of the problem. Assigned values must be determined directly, as
their name implies. The derived contributions are.incorporated by in-
creasing the probability of success in future missions, thus increasing
the probability of eventually achieving future assigned values.
4.3 Direct and Indirect Values
The assigned value function has both direct and indirect contribu-
tions. The direct values of exploring Mars arise from the various kinds
of knowledge that the explorations will produce: visual records of Mars,
significant data on both the biological and physical environment, engi-
neering capability, and operational experience. From these direct con-
tributions, the nation derives indirect contributions such as national
prestige and favorable world opinion. Thus, the indirect value is the
value of obtaining and possessing the knowledge: The existence of the.
indirect components can be demonstrated by observing that if a race of
galactic explorers were to offer us solid information of the type we have
listed under direct contributions (such as a Martian atlas or a guide to
the Martian flora and fauna), the price we would offer would probably be
considerably less than the cost of the Mariner and Viking projects.
Part of the satisfaction comes from having done it ourselves, and the
value function must include this indirect value, which is characteristic
of the project.
4.4 Construction of a Value Scale
The first step in constructing the value function is to establish
an ordinal scale of values that states, for each pair of outcomes, the
outcome that is preferred. The next step is the construction of a car-
dinal scale that allows us to compare the strength of preference. One
way to develop such a scale is to assign points to the different outcomes
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and adjust values until decision-makers are satisfied with the results.
The final step is to construct an absolute dollar scale that interprets
points directly in terms of dollar benefits. The ordinal and cardinal
point scales can be established by intuitive comparisons within the
project scope; the absolute dollar scale requires that the project under
consideration be compared with other space projects in light of NASA's
overall priorities and budget.
The use of cardinal and absolute value scales can be illustrated
by returning to the car purchase example of Section 4.1. We could tell
our agent, who will buy the car for us, the dollar value we assign to
each component of a car's value. We might say, for example, that given
our use characteristics, a car that runs 18 miles to a gallon of gas is
worth $40 a year more to us than a car that runs only 15 miles and that
foam rubber seats are worth $50 more to us than ordinary seats. When we
had similarly specified the dollar value of all possible features, in-
cluding those whose values might not be additive, then our agent would
be able to go into the marketplace, determine the value and price of
every car offered , and return with the most acceptable car for us (which
might, of course, be no car at all). Notice, in following this philosophy
that we do not care whether, in fact, there are any cars for sale that
have all or any part of the features that we have valued. The establish-
ment of the value function depends remotely, if at all, on the spectrum
of cars available. One of the weaknesses prevalent in the literature on
explicit value is that technical feasibility has been incorporated in the
value function.
The point value (cardinal) approach is similar except that points
are assigned to each of the components of value> individually and jointly.
In this case, we would fix a purchase budget for our agent and send him
out to find the best car (highest points) within the budget. Of course,
we might be very sorry if we learned that he could have purchased a much
better car for a little more money or if he paid very dearly for the last
few points he obtained. However, since we can often convert point value
scales to absolute dollar value scales by assigning a dollar value to
each point, the essential difference in the two schemes lies in whether
we want to find the most profitable course of action with or without
budgetary constraints.
It should be emphasized that the main role of the value function is
to serve as a framework for discussion of preferences. The value function
encodes preferences consistently; it does not create them. Consequently,
the decision-maker can insert alternative value specifications to deter-
mine the sensitivity of decisions to changes in the value function. The
process of assigning the value is naturally an iterative one, with com-
ponents of value being added and eliminated as understanding of the prob-
lem grows.
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4.5 Value Tree
To aid in constructing the value function appropriate to a given
target in the solar system, the problem can be visualized as one of con-
structing a value tree. This tree is drawn by considering first the
major assigned components of value, both direct and indirect, then the
subcategories of each type, identified in more and more detail, until
no further distinction is necessary. Then, each tip of the tree is
finally subdivided into achievement categories, each corresponding to
the contribution of one of the achievements to the value subcategory
represented by that tip.
Specifically, the value tree that served as the value function in
the Voyager pilot analysis is pictured in Figure 4.1. The number 1.0'
attached to the node at the extreme left represents the total value of
all the objectives of the pilot Voyager project (thus, the value of
achieving the four outcomes LI, L2, L3, and L4). The four branches
emanating from this node represent the four major categories of value
recognized by the pilot model. The number 0.62 attached to the upper
branch represents the fraction of total value assigned to science. Two
branches emanate from the science node, and 60 percent of the science •
value falls into the category of biological science. The 0.37 attached
to the biological science node represents the fraction of total value
attached to biological science and is obtained by taking 60 percent of
0.62 (the fraction of total value attached to all science). Finally,
the bottom branch following the biological science node indicates that
78 percent of the biological science value is achieved by jumping from
L3 to L4.
The final step in value modeling is to obtain the fraction of total
value to be attached to achieving each of the four levels, If we add
all the contributions to achieving LI (coming from world opinion, U.S.
public favor, physical science, etc.), the result is the fraction of
value that should be attached to achieving LI. The same process is fol-
lowed for reaching L4 from LI, L3 from L2, and L4 from L3, The results
of such a calculation are shown in the lower-lefthand corner of Figure 4.1,
The complete value tree allows us to assign values to any proposed
project. If a project is certain to achieve some of the total values,
then it would be credited with those values. If it has a probability
of less than one of achieving some total value, then it is credited with
its expected contribution. The evaluation of projects can be performed
at any vertical cross-section of the tree. As the components of value
are more carefully broken down and the evaluation is performed to the
right of the tree, the value computation becomes more precise. Of course,
no plan for the project is expected to have a perfect value score.
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0.62 BIOLOGICAL 0.37 0.02.
BENEFIT TO
OTHER SPACE
PROGRAMS
0.004
0.006
0.004
0.006
RESULTS
L1 0.1224 - Perform atmospheric experiments
L2 0.1714 - Return descent TV
L3 0.3511 - Return landed TV and do surface property experiments
L4 0.3551 - Perform life detection experiments
0.0074
0.0074
0.0666
0.2888
0.0750
0.0500
0.1125 .
0.0125
0.0060
0.0300
0.0780
0.0060
0.0120
0.0420
0.0540
0.0120
TA-6152-10R
FIGURE 4.1 THE VALUE TREE USED IN THE VOYAGER PILOT ANALYSIS
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4.6 The Need for Explicit Value Systems and National Profit Measures
Given a value scale and function such as those discussed in the pre-
ceding two sections, the cost of accomplishing our objectives can be sub-
tracted from their value to yield a "national profit." This quantity
provides a figure of merit by which the worth of alternative actions can
be measured. Maximizing profit allows us to minimize cost—but only in
such a way that we do not forego our basic program objectives. This is
especially important if the analysis is examining advanced R&D projects,
for which the restrictions of an,"equal capability analysis" do not make
sense. Advanced systems are generally developed to provide new capabili-
ties that were previously unavailable; an'equal capability cost analysis
will almost surely underestimate what such systems have to offer.
It is possible to examine the sources of national profit which are
attributable to the development of advanced propulsion systems. The
first, and most readily accepted, component of profit is cost reduction
resulting from the development. Such savings could come from either a
less expensive propulsion system that could perform a mission in the
same way or a more capable propulsion system (of equal cost) that could
perform the mission in a less expensive way. An example of the latter
is an electric propulsion system that could replace radioisotope thermal
generators as a spacecraft power source.
A second component of profit is the set of additional accomplishments
that can be achieved at no extra cost. Additional useful capabilities,
if they are available with a propulsion system of equal cost, make the
more capable system more valuable. Examples might be: (1) the availa-
bility of surplus power for enhanced science capability; (2) the capa-
bility to reduce flight times either (a) to achieve earlier results or
(b) to postpone mission expenditures for results achieved at the same
'time (this capability produces an effective cost reduction when discount-
ing); and (3) the possibility of reducing risk either via reduced flight
times or with intrinsically more reliable systems. The problem here
arises when we must choose between two systems of equal cost—for example,
one of higher reliability and another offering shorter flight times.
The third, and very difficult, component of profit is the ability
to perform desirable additional accomplishments at "reasonable" extra
cost. The NEP program exhibited a classic example of this effect, be-
cause developing NEP is the only possible way to rendezvous with the
famous Halley Comet when it next arrives in the 1985-86 time period.
This comet, which reappears only once every 75 years, not only has great
direct scientific value because of its newness and visible activity, but
also possesses high indirect value because of widespread public knowledge
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of its spectacular past visits. With any discount rate greater than in-
flation, the value of this achievement can be considered lost to our gen-
eration if NEP is not developed for a 1983 launch, A less dramatic ex-
ample would be NEP's ability to perform multitarget missions that would
be virtually impossible with ballistic propulsion systems.
Thus, the following situations obtain. Cost reductions, all other
factors being equal, are both universally accepted as profitable and
easily ordered for preferences: the more money that is saved, the more
profitable the outcome. Equal cost capability enhancements are readily
accepted as profitable, but are not easily ordered for preference when
a difficult choice is offered: for example, shorter trip time versus
higher intrinsic reliability. Finally, the ability to perform unique
and desirable missions, like the Halley rendezvous, which can only be
achieved by purchasing and launching an additional $200 million space-
craft , taxes our power to judge intuitively whether this ability is
profitable or not. In all but the first of these situations, logical
and consistent decisions in complex, uncertain problems are difficult,
if not impossible, to obtain intuitively.
An explicit value model is therefore necessary to deal with any
(or all) of the following circumstances:
(1) Propulsion alternatives that make possible additional
missions not achievable by other systems.
(2) Propulsion alternatives that enhance the capability of
some mission through special features (like surplus
available power).
(3) Propulsion alternatives that significantly reduce the
risk of mission failure.
(4) Propulsion alternatives that allow earlier mission
accomplishments.
The third point deserves further elaboration. Although everyone
desires undiminished opportunities for gain at lower "risk," realistic
opportunities usually require that larger risks be undertaken to achieve
larger rewards.30 This condition is definitely true in the space program,
especially when the rewards are defined as net national profit—that is,
value less cost. It is entirely possible that in NASA today excessive
expenditures are being made to reduce or eliminate the risk (probability)
of failure, thereby greatly diminishing or even negating the expected net
profit of some programs. Appendix A gives some simple examples that il-
lustrate the concepts of risk and shows why a logical treatment of risk
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requires explicit values as well as costs. In particular, one definition
of risk as an expected loss:
Risk = (Probability of Failing) X (Cost of Failing)
which was adopted for the APC Risk Comparison Study31 is demonstrated to
be inadequate to deal with issues as important as space program planning.
The fourth point also deserves further elaboration. In the Voyager
analysis, it was shown32 that if values and costs are'discounted with
different discount rates in a sequential decision problem, logical con-
tradictions will arise and inferior alternatives may be selected . The
same difficulty appears in the operation of the propulsion system selec-
tor. When values are set equal to zero, the model operates as a cost
minimizer and^selects NEP for 13 missions. When the values are larger
than the costs, NEP is selected for 15 missions to achieve the values of
2 missions more rapidly.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that a-pure cost minimizer presents
us with a paradox, since the ultimate cost reduction is/to eliminate, or
seriously degrade, missions. Only with a value and profit structure can
we economize efficiently without impairing mission effectiveness. These
results illustrate the importance of developing a value model: that is,
a rational structure for making the value assignment by breaking down
value into more fundamental quantities that may be determined more easily
and precisely. The following sections discuss how a value model can be
applied to decisions regarding advanced propulsion development.
4.7 Establishment of a Relative Value Scale
The Voyager example discussed in the preceding sections has examined
the problem of establishing the relative value of various types of mis-
sions to a single target (e.g., flyby, orbiter, orbiter/lander, surface
sample return) . These judgments should be made by panels of specialists
in each of the targets in the solar system. Then, a higher level ques-
tion arises—namely, what are our relative priorities for exploration
of the various solar system features in light of our basic goals for
planetary exploration. A simple priority ranking was established as
early as 1965 by the Space Science Board33 and is shown in Table 4.1.
Note that if 100 total points are to be divided among the target objects,
such a priority rank ordering already imposes strong constraints on how
these points can be assigned .
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Table 4.1
RELATIVE PRIORITIES OF TARGETS IN SOLAR SYSTEM
"After considering these reports the Working Group
attempted to assign overall priorities to the various
groups of objects on the basis of current scientific
interest and on the bases of their relevance to the
questions of the origin of the solar system, the origin
of life, and the understanding of the Earth. A surpris-
ing degree of unanimity was evident. It should be em-
phasized, however, that these priorities are preliminary
in the sense that they should be modified both by further
debate among scientists in general and by the application
of new data acquired."
Object Rank
Mars ' 1
Moon
2
Venus ' '
Major planets 4
Comets and asteroids 5
Mercury 6
Pluto 7
Dust 8
Source: Reference 33.
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A very comprehensive format for determining such relative priorities
from basic objectives, developed in a RAND study,35 is illustrated in
Figure 4.2. For the purposes of propulsion development decisions, the
structure of the RAND model is far more detailed than necessary. A
structure much closer to that of the Space Science Board is suitable,
but should incorporate a cardinal (numerical) scale of relative prefer-
ence rankings. The scale used here is shown in Table 4.2. Although
this table is by no means a survey or consensus of planetary experts,
its formulation resulted from discussion with a number of JPL and NASA
personnel and incorporates a number of their constructive suggestions.
In constructing this scale, a judgmental separation was made between
the inner and outer solar system. Thus, whereas the RAND study of 1968
favored the inner solar system over the outer by 2:1, it appeared that
today, with much more data available on Mars and with a growing interest
in the role of the giant planets in establishing the origins of the solar
system, a 1:1 relative value would be more appropriate. Since this ratio
can be easily changed, more attention was given to the relative value
scales of the objects within the inner and outer solar system categories.
These scales reflect a number of other recent studies on space exploration
objectives and values.26'28'39
Because of time limitations and incomplete status of the current
work, we were unable to model the value of specific missions to each tar-
get as was done for the Voyager analysis (see Figure 4.1). Instead, some
very rough estimates were made, without the benefit of models and calcu-
lations, as to the fractional value of each target object in the solar
system that would be attained by the successful completion of each mis-
sion in the extended APC mission set. This effort produced the scale
shown in Table 4.3, where the most valuable missions (Mars rover and
Mars sample return) are about 22 times more valuable than the least valu-
able mission (Halley flyby). Some model runs were made using these values
to determine whether they differed substantially from runs made assuming
equal values for all missions. For illustration, the relative values as-
signed in Table 4.2 to the solar system targets and the fraction of these
values assumed to be accomplished by the APC missions are shown in Table
4.3. For the calculations of the next section, it is useful to note that
since the relative mission value is the product of two percentages, its
scale is 100 X 100 = 10000 times a true fractional mission accomplishment.
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Earth
and Its
Environment
Other Cryptic Sources
.
Quasars
The angular size of each sector is drawn proportional to the direct values assigned
by a group of experts.
FIGURE 4.2 THE VALUE PIE USED BY RAND (SEE REFERENCE 25)
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Table 4.2
A RELATIVE VALUE SCALE FOR SPACE EXPLORATION
Inner Solar System 50.0%
Mars
Venus
Mercury
Outer Solar System
Jupiter
Saturn and Rings
Uranus
Neptune
Pluto
Meteorites
Small Particles
Large Asteroids
Other Asteroids
Halley's Comet
Other Comets
Interplanetary
Space
30.0
12.0
8.0
50.0%
17.0
12.0
2.5
2.5
2.0
1.1
1.1
2.0
1.0
1.8
3.6
3.4
(34.0%)
(24.0)
(5.0)
(5.0)
(4.0)
(2.2)
(2.2)
(4.0)
(2.0)
(3.6)
(7.2)
(6.8)
100 .0%
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Table 4.3
SAMPLE RELATIVE VALUES FOR PLANETARY EXPLORATION MISSIONS
Encke Rendezvous
Venus Radar Mapper
Mars Semiautonomous Rover
Mercury Orbiter
Saturn Orbiter/Probe
Asteroid Rendezvous (Vesta) (large ast.)
Halley Flyby
Jupiter Orbiter
U/N (Uranus Probe)
Uranus Orbiter/Probe
Venus Large Lander
Neptune Orbiter/Probe
Jupiter/Pluto Flyby
Ganymede Orbiter/Lander
Mars Surface Sample Return
Halley Rendezvous
S/U/N (Uranus Probe)
0.1 AU Solar Probe
Saturn Rings Probe
Ceres Surface Sample Return
Phobos/Deimos Surface Sample Return
Relative •
Target
% Value
3.6
12.0
30.0
8c.O
12.0
i . o r
1.8
17.0
2.5,2.5
2.5
12.0
2; 5
17.0,2.0
17.0
30.0
1.8
12.0,2.5,2.5
3.4
12.0
20.0
30.0
Mission
% Value
30
25
40
30
40
60
30
40
40,30
40
40
40
10,40
20
40
70
10,10,10
50
20
75
10
Relative
Mission
Value
108
300
1200
240
480
60
54
680
175
100
480
100
250
340
1200
126
170
170
240
150
300
66
4.8 Assignment of Total Value to Program
To decide whether a given mission should be performed, we must com-
pare its value to its cost and reject those missions whose values do not
exceed their costs in a given planetary exploration strategy. This un-
dertaking requires a step beyond the assignment of relative values to
proposed missions—namely, the translation of these relative values to
a dollar scale. There are at least two approaches, which can be described
as "top-down" and "bottom-up." The top-down approach requires establish-
ing the total value of space exploration. It can be compared to estab-
lishing a space exploration endowment fund, the interest and appreciation
from which can be used to perform missions. Missions can only be pursued
that are feasible within the income stream of the endowment. The overall
size of the fund is the total value of all of our objectives in space, as
they are viewed at the time the fund is established. The relative values
of various space targets such as those shown in Table 4.2 correspond to
percentage shares of the initial principal of the fund.
It is clear that in reality both the total value and relative values
of space exploration change in response to the political, economic, and
technological climate of the times. Thus, the value of sending additional
Apollo missions to the moon after the first moon landing changed not only
because the political impact of being first to the moon was past, but also
because the economy had turned down and because the technical impact was
no longer unique. We mean to imply here a total value assignment that
incorporates all of these realities—both direct and indirect value.
One way of assessing total program value is to assign an average
annual value (such as is represented by budgetary constraints) and to
determine the present value of that amount received every year for the
foreseeable future. Using several discount rates, various present values
corresponding to a constant annual amount will be obtained, so this method
places high emphasis on determining the proper discount rate for NASA
planning. Although this issue has been examined,19 it has certainly not
been settled.
For a discount rate D, the present value of receiving a constant
annual amount, V, forever is:
V + i i 4- m
(1 +D)
so that discount rates of 5% and 10% correspond to present values of
2100% and 1100%, respectively, of the annual amount. The total present
value implications of several annual budget levels28'39 at different
conceivable discount rates are shown in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4
PRESENT VALUES CORRESPONDING TO VARIOUS
ANNUAL BUDGET LEVELS AND DISCOUNT RATES
(Millions of Dollars)
Annual Effective Discount Rates
Budgets
$400
250
100
50
2%
$20400
12750
5100
2550
3%
$13720
8600
3430
1720
5%
$8400
5250
2100
1050
10%
$4400
2750
1100
550
It is evident that the relationship between annual budgets, discount
rates, and present value is fairly sensitive to the choice of rate—so
sensitive in fact that this method is best used as a consistency check
on the values implied by the indirect method defined below.
Since most people find it difficult to think in terms of such quan-
tities as the total value of space exploration, an indirect conceptual
procedure has been devised to deduce the total value from the relative
value scale and projected mission costs. This approach is the bottom-up
approach. Value is defined as the maximum cost one would be willing to
spend to accomplish a mission successfully. Note that if a less expen-
sive way to accomplish the same mission becomes available, it should not
reduce the value of the mission, but only increase our desire to accomplish
it—as measured by the mission profit. Thus, the approval of missions by
NASA management and Congress is taken as a statement that their value ex-
ceeds their cost. In fact, since all missions have a finite chance of
failing, 'approval should imply that their value exceeds their cost by
enough of a margin (profit) so that the expected profit of the mission
exceeds zero (see Appendix A). Therefore, this indirect procedure begins
by assuming that together NASA management and Congress reflect national
values implicitly through their approval cycle.
Next, this procedure assumes that relative values, or relative ef-
fectiveness ratings, can be explicitly assigned to a set of planetary
mission outcomes as was done in the previous section. Then, the cost of
the least cost-effective mission in an approved set of missions defines
a lower bound of the values of missions in that set. At this point an
assumption is made that should be generally acceptable to NASA planners,
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namely that mission designers and planners are striving to design optimal
missions in the sense of achieving the highest value for the lowest cost.
Effectively, this assumption says that NASA hires talented people who are
doing a conscientious job. Given this condition, it follows that for an
optimally designed and maximal approvable mission set, the least cost-
effective mission is the last mission that is "socially profitable."
Therefore the Value (last included mission) less the Cost (last included
mission) must be approximately zero.
In this way, the difficult overall total value judgment is avoided
and replaced by a judgment on how large a planetary exploration program
with a known cost structure is "approvable." The total value then follows
from mission costs and relative values. This procedure would appear to
tie the values strongly to the costs. A more careful consideration, how-
ever, shows that this is not so, because if the total cost could be re-
duced by 25%, some additional missions would probably be flown. The total
value of planetary exploration is most closely reflected by the budget
constraints placed on that part of the space program; the job of mission
planners is to accomplish the largest number of valued objectives within
the overall total value constraint.
Figure 4.3 shows the missions of Table 4.3 plotted in a mission bene-
fit versus mission cost plane. The costs used are those corresponding to
the individual mission-dependent spacecraft design concept (exclusive of
propulsion system costs) . To evaluate the total program profit implied
by different approvable mission sets (here for illustration APC extended,
APC base, or von Braun), we shall use the right triangle construction
shown in Figure 4.4. Let \ be the dollar value assigned to the accom-
plishment of one point on the scale of Table 4.3 (10,000 points equal
total accomplishment of our planetary exploration objectives). Further-
more, let B be the expected benefit of the mission and C be its total
cost. Then \B is the dollar value of accomplishing the mission under
consideration, and hence X.B-C is the profit of that mission.
Since B is the height of the right triangle shown and \B the base,
it follows that the slope of the hypotenuse is given by B/AJB = \ (op-
posite side divided by adjacent side). This result can be visualized
geometrically as shining a light beam across the figure from the direc-
tion of the upper right-hand corner, so that the rays of the beam have
the slope \ . The expected profit for the mission is determined by the
shadow of the mission point on the expected cost axis, with profit in-
creasing to the left.
If we shine the light beam on all of the mission points simultane-
ously, as in Figure 4.5, the shadows of the points on the expected cost
axis give the expected profit for each mission. The mission with the
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leftmost shadow is the mission of maximum profit. As the slope A. of
the light beam increases, lower cost missions will have the leftmost ex-
pected profit shadow; as the slope of the light beam decreases the higher
benefit, higher cost missions will have the leftmost expected profit
shadow. The geometry of this problem shows that sweeping the slope of
the light beam from vertical to horizontal is equivalent to sweeping A.
from zero to infinity.
If a mission belongs to an approvable set, then we assume that it
is profitable. Only missions whose shadows fall to the left of the origin
have positive values of profit. Thus for an entire set to be approvable,
the slope A. must be so small that the shadows of all the mission points
in their benefit-cost plane lie in the "negative cost" (i.e., positive
profit) region of the cost axis. For A. to be small, the total dollar
value measure A. must be large.
A simple algorithm to identify the maximum slope A. —and hence the
minimum total value—which will allow all missions to be profitable is
to look for the mission with the smallest ratio of benefit to cost.
Geometrically, the lowest benefit to cost ratio belongs to the first
mission point intercepted by a radial line through the origin making an
angular sweep beginning from the positive cost axis. If missions 8 and
11 (which have the lowest benefit, to cost ratio) are profitable, then
the slope A. .must be less than the ratio of their benefit points to
their mission costs, e.g., 100/$0.406 billion. Thus the total value,
10,OOOA., must be larger than $40.6 billion if mission 11 is to be profit-
able under these crude assumptions.
The dollar value scale that emerges from this procedure is shown in
Table 4.5, which exhibits a run of the base case for Centaur and NEP,
using the relative value of Table 4.3 with missions 8 and 11 just barely
profitable. With this value structure, the missions of highest profit
are 16, 4, 9, 12, and 6, which means that any strategy option incapable
of performing one of these missions will show a severely reduced profit.
This case also shows most of the extended APC missions, namely 17-21, to
be more profitable than missions 7, 8, 11, and 13 of the APC base mission
set. So either the relative target values and percentage mission accom-
plishments at target should be revised, or certain of the extended mis-
sions should be interchanged with less profitable missions in the base
set. Likewise missions 14-16 of the APC base mission model appear more
profitable than missions 2, 7, and 10 of the von Braun model. A similar
inconsistency obtains here.
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One explanation for this apparent inconsistency might be that tech-
nical feasibility has been intermingled with actual value in determining
these mission sets. These observations highlight the most useful role
of an explicit value model, namely uncovering apparent inconsistencies
in our proposed allocation of resources. Subsequent examination of the
issues may lead to a better value model, or even to a better set of mis-
sions. In any case, the explicit value model plays an important role in
simplifying communication and identifying difficulties in an otherwise
very complex area.
The sensitivities to NEP specific weight and unit cost resulting
from this relative value model would be exactly the same in Tables 3.8-3.10,
unless certain missions could not be performed. In such cases, this value
model would produce a larger or smaller sensitivity according to whether
the total profit of the missions eliminated were larger in Table 4.5 or in
Table 3.7. For example, since 120 kW NEP cannot accomplish mission 12
using multimission modular spacecraft design, this combination of alter-
natives would show a $2 billion profit reduction with this relative value
structure because of the loss of mission 12. The very interesting results
of how this relative value structure affects the profitability of NEP as
opposed to other advanced propulsion alternatives are explored in
Chapter V.
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V DETERMINISTIC DECISION ANALYSIS
5.1 Examination of NEP Alternatives
This chapter is devoted to illustrating how the deterministic model
and value structure described in the previous chapters can be applied to
propulsion decision situations. Because of the incomplete status of this
analysis and the very detailed parallel APC work of JPL and Mathematica
most of the situations examined in this chapter are oversimplified.
Nonetheless, they highlight important trends, give a quantitative expres-
sion to many previously qualitative opinions, and demonstrate the ability
of our deterministic model to deal with such questions.
Table 5.1 compares the total program profit less NEP development,
when both NEP and Centaur are available, to the total program profit if
only the latter is available. Comparisons are made for three mission
sets and three combinations of discount and inflation rate, all within
the context of the equal value model used in Chapter III. Thus each
entry in Tables 5.1-5.5 represents a separate model run like the NEP
base case shown in Table 3.7. Note that the total program profit with
NEP, less the cost of NEP development, is always greater than the total
program profit without NEP, even for the highest discount rate and the
smallest mission set examined. Therefore, the performance degradation
encountered if only the Centaur were available for space exploration in
the 1980s and 1990s is so severe that the development cost of NEP is al-
ways justified—in the absence of other advanced propulsion alternatives.
Obviously, for the relative value model of Chapter IV, according to which
many missions have significantly higher profits, NEP would have an even
more compelling advantage. Thus, if the country had only two alterna-
tives, to live with the Centaur only or to develop NEP (and use it when-
ever advantageous), we should develop NEP.
A second simple decision situation that can be examined in this way
is the NEP power level decision, toward which this pilot analysis has
been focused. This comparison assumes for the 120 kW NEP case that the
mission-dependent spacecraft design would be used. Naturally, the 240 kW
GNEP case will always be more attractive with the multimission modular
design, so that is always used here. Table 5.2 shows that the higher
power level appears preferable to the reference 120 kW reactor for nearly
all combinations of mission sets and discount rates. Only for the highest
discount rate and the two less ambitious mission sets examined does NEP
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Table 5.1
TOTAL. PROGRAM PROFITS WITH CENTAUR ONLY AND
WITH CENTAUR/NEP (LESS NEP DEVELOPMENT COST)
(Millions of Dollars)
Discount Rate (D)
Equal to
Inflation Rate (I)
D = 10%
I = 5%
D = 15%
1 = 5%
Mission Sets
20 APC Ext.
$10121
5915
$ 4079
2393
$ 1723
1059
15 APC Base
$7515
- 5560
$3064
2384
$1304
*1123
9 von Braun
$4468
4227
$1838
1706
$ 747
741
Prop. Systems
CENT/ NEP
CENT alone
CENT/NEP
CENT alone
CENT/NEP
CENT alone
0
o
c
o
!H
0
"H
0
IH
ft
0
g
•H
The smaller mission set is more profitable since the Centaur performs one
of the APC extended missions so slowly that its discounted value is sig-
nificantly less than its discounted cost.
Table 5.2
TOTAL PROGRAM PROFITS WITH CENTAUR/NEP AND
WITH CENTAUR/GNEP (LESS NEP OR GNEP DEVELOPMENT COST)
(Millions of Dollars)
Discount Rate (D)
Equal to
Inflation Rate (I)
D = 10%
1=5%
D = 15%
I = 5%
Mission Sets
20 APC Ext.
$10121
10881
$ 4079
4376
$ 1723
1841
15 APC Base
$7515
7878
$3064
3146
$1304
1303
9 von Braun
$4468
4612
$1838
1838
$ 747
707
Prop. Systems
.CENT/NEP
CENT/GNEP
CENT/GNEP
CENT/GNEP
CENT/GNEP
CENT/GNEP
0
O
a
0
0
•H
EH
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show a very small advantage over GNEP. Although such results are hardly
conclusive, being based on preliminary data without any consideration of
uncertainty, this table strongly suggests that a GNEP-type system should
be given serious consideration if the United States resumes a program of
thermonic reactor research.
The preceding observation may prove incorrect, however, since a two-
stage tug direct escape combination with the 120 kW NEP system could
probably accomplish the Venus large-lander mission and thus would make
the 120 kW multimission modular combination even more attractive. The
main reason why NEP does not gain full advantage of the spacecraft sav-
ings associated with the multimission modular exploration strategy is
that the Venus large-lander mission is a highly profitable mission that
carries a strong penalty in the form of reduced profit if it cannot be
accomplished. An extension of the program logic to add the capabilities
and- costs of additional direct escape stages to the 120 kW NEP, when
necessary, would be a significant model improvement that would facilitate
a more careful examination of the relative merits of NEP and GNEP. The
basis for such an extension would be calculations such as those support-
ing Figure 3.4 for the entire APC extended mission set.
These tables provide a quantitative expression for many of the quali-
tative opinions that have been expressed by engineers and managers in the
NEP development program. They show clearly how the advantage of the
CENT/NEP combination over- Centaur alone depends on the nation's time i
preference for money (desire for early returns on expenditure) and on
the size and structure of the planetary exploration program that is as-
sumed to represent national goals in space. Both are value judgments
that must be set by higher level decision-makers outside of the NEP pro-
gram. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show in a simple way the sensitivity of NEP
program decisions to NASA preferences and values .
5.2 Comparison of NEP and GNEP with Other Advanced Propulsion Alternatives
The observations of the preceding section are limited in impact be-
cause of the recent curtailment of the U.S. Thermionic program. This
limitation suggests an additional application of the deterministic model—
namely, to compare the NEP and GNEP cases to other advanced propulsion
alternatives such as chemical tug (TUG), 20 kW solar electric (SEP), and
40 kW solar electric (GSEP). Several points need to be made, however,
before presenting any such results. First, it should be emphasized that
the decision analysis was not focused on the comparison of all advanced
propulsion options; that was the subject of the APC study conducted by
Mathematica and JPL. However, the decision analysis model is not re-
stricted to NEP alternatives, since the selector logic has been built
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to pick out the most effective propulsion system from any available types.
Therefore, it is possible to examine NEP in comparison with these other
alternatives simply by inserting their flight times into the model data.
One restriction of these results on TUG, SEP, and GSEP is that no
detailed study of their unit costs has been made (the unit costs used in
the APC study have been taken without question) and no development costs
have been incorporated into the program for systems other than NEP and
GNEP. If, however, the total program profit obtained by the CENT/NEP
(or CENT/GNEP) combination minus the NEP (GNEP) development cost already
exceeds the total program profit of some other combination of advanced
propulsion alternatives—without any allowance for the development cost
of these other alternatives—then the NEP (GNEP) alternative should be
clearly preferable. Another limitation of these results is that they
have only considered planetary exploration missions, because the geo-
centric missions appeared not to influence the NEP power level decision
which was the focus of this analysis. These geocentric missions, how-
ever, could be very important in comparing CENT/NEP with alternatives
like CENT/TUG or CENT/SEP. This problem should be the subject of further
analysis.
Table 5.3 shows the total program profits—without any development
expenses—for CENT/TUG, CENT/SEP/GSEP, and CENT/TUG/SEP/GSEP. It has
been assumed in these tabulations that, if SEP is available, GSEP will
also be available for an additional unit cost of $2.3 million, but with
little or no additional development necessary. This situation is to be
contrasted with that of the NEP; in the latter situation the thermionic
community believes that even if a 120 kW NEP system were available, it
would require a significant additional development and testing program
to obtain a 240 kW system.
Table 5.3 shows that the CENT/NEP or CENT/GNEP alternatives are
superior to CENT/TUG, CENT/SEP/GSEP and CENT/TUG/SEP/GSEP for all cases
involving the assumption that the APC extended mission set reflects na-
tional planetary exploration values. For the cases in which this assump-
tion does not hold, however, one or more of the alternatives in Table 5.3
is more profitable than the corresponding NEP alternatives in Table 5.2.
Of course, if the proper development costs for the other propulsion sys-
tems in Table 5.3 were subtracted from their true operating profits, they
might no longer exceed the NEP alternatives in total profit. On the other
hand, there is not a situation of clear NEP dominance. Thus, a careful
refinement of the total value assumptions—as reflected in the size of
the mission model—is especially important in comparing the NEP alterna-
tives with other advanced propulsion candidates.
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Table 5.3
TOTAL PROGRAM PROFITS FOR CENT/TUG,
CENT/SEP/GSEP, AND CENT/TUG/SEP/GSEP
(WITHOUT ANY DEVELOPMENT COSTS SUBTRACTED)
(Millions of Dollars)
T
im
e
 
P
re
fe
re
nc
e
Discount Rate (D)
Equal to
Inflation Rate (I)
D = 10%
I = 5%
D = 15%
I = 5%
Mission Sets
APC Ext.
$8900
7798
9582
$3531
2990
3907
$1512
1278
1724
APC Base
$7323
7443
8005
$2948
2946
3323
$1290
1312
1503
von Braun
$4260
4909
4942
$1798
2037
2125
$805
913
966
Prop. Systems
C/T
C/S/GS
C/T/S/GS
C/T
C/S/GS
C/T/S/GS
C/T
C/S/GS
. C/T/S/GS
79
To remove the problem presented by the absence of TUG and SEP devel-
opment costs in our analysis, another approach is possible. We can com-
pare CENT/TUG to CENT/TUG/NEP, and so forth, to determine whether the
additional profit generated by having NEP (GNEP) available will justify
its development cost. Table 5.4 is the analog of Table 5.3 adding NEP
to each alternative, and Table 5.5 does the same for GNEP. All entries
in these tables marked with an asterisk (*) gain enough profit from the
availability of NEP .or GNEP to justify the development costs shown.
These results are extremely powerful since they do not depend on
the non-NEP development costs and already take NEP (GNEP) development
costs into account. The tables show that if our space exploration value
system is best represented by the APC extended mission set, the develop-
ment of NEP (or GNEP) is profitable for any of the time preference param-
eters used. If the von Braun mission set is the best representative of
our national space exploration goals and values, then NEP (or GNEP) should
only be developed if (1) solar electric is not developed and (2) the na-
tional time preference is not as strong as that expressed by a discount
rate of 15% and an inflation rate of 5%. For the APC base mission set,
NEP and GNEP are generally justifiable, but not always.
To test these results, analogous model cases were examined using the
relative value model discussed in sections 4.7 and 4.8. Even with this
value model, NEP cannot be justified for a 10% effective discount rate
using the von Braun mission model. Since the equal value model and the
relative value model span a wide range of value models, this conclusion
may be independent of the exact value model employed. A conclusion such
as this one, which holds for a wide range of assumptions, is said to be
robust. This robustness emphasizes again the importance of NASA's time
preference and total planetary exploration value for the NEP development
decision.
Additional comparisons of the type shown in this chapter, together
with further refinement of the model logic and the deterministic data
used, should be extremely rewarding in developing a quantitative intui-
tion among JPL and NASA program managers. They can also gain a much
deeper understanding of the interaction between time preference and
value assumptions, on the one hand, and propulsion system development
decisions in the other. The use of a simple interactive model such as
the one delivered to JPL in the course of the decision analysis should
complement the very detailed work of the APC study. This model allows
insight to be developed via rapid feedback on the implications of many
different model assumptions.
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5.3 The Timing Decision for NEP Development
Our analysis has not focused on the optimal timing for the NEP de-
velopment program. This section discusses how the deterministic model
can be used to gain insight into this question. Both model revisions
and data refinements would be necessary to make a definitive study of
whether a development program for a 1983 launch or a slower program,
such as for a 1986 launch, would be more consistent with our space ex-
ploration preferences.
A NEP development program geared for a 1983 launch has been used as
our reference case since a great deal of thought has been given to using
NEP for a Halley's comet rendezvous. Many NASA studies and pronouncements
have acknowledged high scientific interest in such a mission. NEP is the
only propulsion system under consideration that could accomplish a ren-
dezvous—as opposed to a short-encounter flyby—with this comet, which
only enters our environment every 75 years. Thus, if we do not accomplish
a rendezvous with Halley's comet during its next visit in 1986, the value
of this accomplishment can be considered lost to our generation for any
realistic choice of discount rate (e.g., a 5% discount rate over 75 years
reduces the present value of a delayed accomplishment to about 3% of the
value that it could achieve today).
For both NEP and GNEP, the deterministic model currently has develop-
ment cost streams for 1983 and 1986 launch years. In each case, the pre-
liminary opinion of thermionic experts was that the longer- development
program would be about $50 million less expensive. Whereas this projec-
tion has not been examined in detail, it implies that 10 years is too
short a time in which to develop a reliable NEP system with minimal re-
sources and that 13 years allows more flexibility to overcome potential
program problems without being faced with large unforeseen expenditures.
The existing deterministic model logic does not check the development
program against the mission set to see whether NEP would be available be-
tween 1983 and 1986. It is simple, however, to make these adjustments to
the model outputs, such as that shown in Table 3.7. There are three types
of adjustments to be made. First, if NEP is not available by 1983, then
the profit of the Halley rendezvous is lost, so the total profit must be
reduced by the profit of that mission, number 17. For all other missions
with launches scheduled between 83 and 86, the launch can either be de-
layed until NEP is available or the second best propulsion system—if
any—can be used in the originally scheduled launch year. Using equal
discount and inflation rate, there is no penalty for delayed achievements,
so we would always prefer to wait for a less expensive propulsion system.
In the more realistic case where the discount rate exceeds the inflation
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rate, the profit reduction resulting from a delayed launch because of
discounting must be compared with the profit reduction resulting from
employing a propulsion system with a higher effective cost.
For the APC extended mission set using a 10% discount rate and 5%
inflation rate, the changes to the base case run are as follows. If NEP
is not available until 1986, the Halley rendezvous mission is lost, re-
ducing profit by $358 million. Six other missions scheduled to be launched
before 1986 need to be postponed or launched with Centaur instead of NEP.
The profit impact is minimized by launching mission 2 with Centaur instead
of NEP, at a loss of $18.5 million, and delaying the launch of missions
5, 6, 9, 18, and 19 until 1986 when NEP is available, at a loss of $88 mil-
lion. Thus, the .'total profit reduction under these conditions resulting
from a three-year NEP development time increase to 1986 is $465 million.
This reduction should be compared with the cost savings of the slower de-
velopment program which has a present value of $78 million.
If the discount rate is assumed to equal the inflation rate, no
penalty is assigned to delayed accomplishments, so the loss of the profit
from the Halley's comet mission should be the only penalty for delaying
the development of NEP. This case alone amounts to $699 million,
using the equal value model (and $377 million using the relative value
model of Chapter IV), which would dominate the $50 million development
cost savings of the slower development program. If there is no penalty
for delaying accomplishments, however, we should be indifferent to per-
forming the Halleyfs rendezvous in 1986 or in 2061 when it will next re-
turn. The absurdity of this statement indicates that we do have a pref-
erence for earlier accomplishments. Therefore, we should be using some
discount rate, however small. Furthermore, without an expression of time
preference, the entire issue of faster versus slower development programs
is meaningless and impossible to address.
For the two smaller mission sets, a slower development program ap-
pears to be appropriate, but for any mission set including the Halley's
comet rendezvous, the cost, savings are negligible compared with the profit
lost. In this way, the model can be used to provide a quantitative ex-
pression to the value of a Halley's rendezvous mission in terms of poten-
tial development savings that could be obtained only by foregoing this
mission. Such a study should begin by a careful comparison of the two
development cost streams.
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VI CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this effort was to develop a logical procedure for
selecting NEP development alternatives that reflect technical feasibil-
ity, JPL/NASA project objectives, and the economic environment of the
project. This report has presented the partial evolution of a decision
model from the underlying philosophy of decision analysis to a determin-
istic pilot phase which is responsive to these requirements. The general
manner in which this decision model can be employed to examine propulsion
development alternatives, as well as the way in which it can be used to
answer more specific questions, such as which propulsion systems to use
on which missions, has been illustrated in the previous sections.
6.1 Steps Necessary To Complete This Analysis
The. decision analysis project was terminated close to the conclusion
of the deterministic phase, but prior to a critical aspect of it'—namely,
presentation of the deterministic analysis to JPL and NASA management.
Such a presentation would stimulate their review of the data used, the
model structure, and the pilot level assumptions. The data, logic, and
assumptions pertaining to NEP development should be reviewed by thermionic
specialists, whereas appropriate choices for JPL/NASA time preference and
value structure need to be reviewed at a higher level. Exercising the
deterministic model so far has given insight into which types of decisions
might change in response to different assumptions.
After presenting tentative results of the deterministic analysis,
some improvements in data, model structure, and assumptions would no doubt
be forthcoming and should be incorporated in the analysis. Some capabil-
ity for analyzing the effect of TFE lifetime should also be added to the
model. At this stage, final sensitivities should be run, simplifications
made in the model wherever possible, and crucial variables selected for
the probabilistic analysis, in conjunction with JPL/NASA experts. This
effort would complete the deterministic phase.
The deterministic analysis undertaken thus far indicates that the
size of mission set chosen, the discount rate used, and other factors can
change the relative attractiveness of NEP versus GNEP, as well as alter
the attractiveness of NEP or GNEP relative to nonnuclear advanced propul-
sion alternatives. Thus, in all likelihood, the analysis would continue
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into a probabilistic phase in which the uncertainty in crucial variables
would be explicitly considered. The steps are described in Task III of
SRI's proposal to JPL.14
Some modifications of the model would be needed at this stage, spe-
cifically to incorporate the probability of failure for various propulsion
system and stage combinations. It is likely that the SRI decision tree
programs would be used to extend the analysis to accommodate these proba-
bilistic features. This approach would allow us to choose the best al-
ternative with the various failure modes taken into account.
After encoding the uncertainty in the crucial variables, a proba-
bility distribution on the net present worth of the various alternatives
will be derived. To evaluate the certain equivalent of a probability
distribution on worth, techniques to include risk aversion may be needed
if JPL/NASA decision-makers do not want to be expected value decision-
makers, i.e., to play the averages. If not, the appropriate risk atti-
tude must be determined and incorporated in the analysis. The concept
of risk attitude and its consistent application throughout space program
planning should be of great importance to NASA. Risk attitude as it per-
tains to space applications has been discussed in Appendix A.
Having expressed the data in probabilistic form, extended the model
to a probabilistic structure, and encoded JPL/NASA risk attitude, the
probabilistic analysis would recommend the superior development alterna-
tives. Furthermore, value of information calculations, which are made
possible by the probabilistic form of the data, would be performed to
provide insight into whether to proceed immediately with a development
alternative or to gather additional information through research before
being committed to a particular NEP design.
A possible refinement to this model would be to include more of the
advanced propulsion alternatives at a greater level of detail. This step
might require models of propulsion system performance, such as the pay-
load versus flight time curves shown for NEP in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
A rapid turnaround or even interactive model would be provided to comple-
ment the detailed runs of the APC study. The work could also be reoriented
toward determining whether we should reconsider nuclear electric propul-
sion in the future by extending the analysis of Section V.
Of course, there is no such thing as a "final analysis" (in the
sense of ultimate refinement); there are only decisions that the analy-
sis supports. The degree of refinement of the analysis must be economic
in terms of the resources to be allocated by the decision. The analysis
presented here has not yet reached that level. Its purpose is to show
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the feasibility of the approach. The amount of resources already spent
in examining advanced propulsion concepts provides an idea of a reason-
able amount that could be devoted to a decision analysis of the entire
project.
6.2 Future Use of Decision Analysis by NASA and Other Agencies
Decision analysis in principle is applicable to any decision-making
problem. It is economic to apply it only to problems concerning the al-
location of significant amounts of resources. Thus, its use is especially
appropriate for NASA and other governmental agencies. The potential for
application at NASA is especially high because, by the nature of NASA's
work, its staff has high analytical capability, and therefore should be
receptive to the decision analysis approach and capable of putting it into
practice.
The principles of decision analysis bear reiteration in this con-
text. The discipline of decision analysis provides a language and philos-
ophy for approaching any decision problem, as well as logical and quanti-
tative procedures for implementing this philosophy. Both of these aspects
are important in their own right, and together they provide a powerful aid
to the decision-making process.
The existence of the language allows us to be precise in specifying
the many factors that influence a decision. The most important features
of the language are its ability to represent the uncertainties that in-
evitably infest a decision problem, as well as the values and preferences
being used by decision-makers.
In representing uncertainty, the language of probability is used,
which allows specification of our initial information regarding the un-
certainties and the incorporation of new information as it is produced .
There is no need for vagueness in the language that describes uncertainty—
admitting our ignorance is the first step to new knowledge.
Placing values and preferences in unambiguous terms is equally im-
portant in describing a decision problem. By values, we mean the desir-
ability of each outcome; by preferences, we mean the attitudes of the
decision-maker toward temporal postponement or uncertainty in the out-
comes he receives.
Decision analysis provides both philosophical and operational guide-
lines for the delegation of responsibility and transmittal of information
in an organization. If we wish someone to make an effective decision, we
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must provide him not only with a description of the problem, but also
with the values and preferences that are relevant to the decision. If
these quantities can be stated explicitly, we can ensure that everyone
in the organization is acting consistently with them. For example, we
can ensure that everyone is acting consistently (i.e., with the same
state of information) regarding the probability of life in the solar
system, or the probability that a given device will operate properly,
as well as in assigning value to such things as scientific knowledge,
national prestige, and the loss of human life.
Many sources of confusion and differences can be resolved, or at
least focused, when we are able to use unambiguous terms. People who
differ over the best alternative to follow may find that their disagree-
ments lie in the areas of probability assignments, values, or preferences.
Thus, two persons who are equally willing to take a risk may disagree
because they assign different probabilities to various outcomes; or two
persons who assign the same probability to the outcomes may differ in
their aversion to risk. The formal language of decision analysis provides
the means by which the real nature of disagreement can be uncovered.
Since decision analysis encodes information, values, and preferences
in terms of hard numbers, it allows the use of logical and quantitative
procedures as an analytical aid to the decision-making process. Many
techniques have been developed to implement these analyses, such as the
decision tree programs discussed in the Voyager report.5 Of course, the
accurate formulation of problems in quantitative terms permits and stimu-
lates the development of new techniques for solution. The decision analy-
sis procedure provides documentation of the state of information at any
stage of the problem and determines whether the gathering of further in-
formation is economically justifiable.
In new applications, aspects of decision analysis not utilized in
this work may become important. The planning of other space projects is
likely to be similar in concepts and techniques to the problem of advanced
propulsion for planetary exploration presented here. The move to the next
higher level—that is, the allocation of resources between different NASA
divisions—is likely to require additional considerations. Ultimately,
we hope to see the application of decision analysis to the problem of al-
location among various governmental programs. This of course will require
an understanding and acceptance of this new discipline on a broad scale.
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Appendix
MEASURING THE VALUE OF RISK REDUCTION
Decision analysis carefully distinguishes between uncertainty34—which
is expressed by the probabilities of future events—and risk—which com-
prises both the probabilities and the consequences of future events.
Thus, uncertainty can be expressed for any important variable of the
problem, whereas risk is an appropriate concept only for the uncertainty
in the program outcomes. These outcomes are the factors that will deter-
mine the ultimate worth of the program and typically take the form of
corporate or "national" profit.
For example, consider a planetary exploration mission. If the space-
craft fails to reach its target or reaches its target but returns no in-
formation (e.g., because of radio failure), then the cost of the mission
is lost and nothing of value is accomplished. In this case, the national
profit is negative, specifically the negative of the mission cost. If
the spacecraft accomplishes all of its stated objectives, then some value
(greater than the mission cost) is achieved and thus produces a positive
national profit equal to the value less the cost. Section IV systemati-
cally explains how a value function can be developed for space explora-
tion. Of course, intermediate outcomes with partial accomplishments also
are obtained; these outcomes may or may not yield positive national profit.
Once a reasonable set of at least representative mission outcomes
and the value and cost of each have been established, one would like to
know the probability of each outcome. Given a complete set of outcomes
(one of which will occur) together with the profit and probability of
occurrence corresponding to each outcome, we have a complete description
of the uncertain proposition. Such a description is called a lottery.
A very general lottery is shown in Figure A.I. The term "reward" will
be used in a very general way to describe either the various outcomes
of the lottery or the respective profits associated with these outcomes.
Life becomes difficult when we must choose among alternative un-
certain propositions, i.e., different lotteries. In order to define
clearly an approach to risk, let us for the moment remove complexity
from the problem by examining lotteries with only two outcomes and re-
move the controversial value issues by dealing in simple monetary rewards.
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Two-outcome lotteries, where the two states can be thought of as failure
and success, are a reasonable first approximation to space exploration
missions.
Figure A.2 illustrates two such lotteries. If we are asked to choose
one of these propositions, how should we proceed? One measure that might
be considered as a basis for selecting between lotteries is the expecta-
tion, computed by multiplying the profit of each outcome by its probabil-
ity and summing over all outcomes. This calculation has been performed
for the two lotteries in Figure A.2. Since the rewards for the two
lotteries are identical, the lottery with the highest probability of
"success" has the highest expected profit. Indeed, no logical reason
exists for anyone to prefer the lottery with the lower expected profit;
in lotteries with equal rewards, any rational procedure will maximize
the probability of success.
The choice between the two lotteries shown in Figure A.3, however,
may be more difficult. Here, the lottery with the highest expectation
also has the largest probability of failure. Although few people would
hesitate to accept the risk entailed in either of these lotteries, the
situation would be quite different if the losses were hundreds, thousands,
or even many millions of dollars, as they might be in an unsuccessful
space shot. In particular, the lotteries in this figure illustrate very
clearly that uncertain propositions cannot be evaluated by their expected
losses if the profits involved differ substantially. This simple example
shows the problems inherent in the APC proposed definition of risk.31
The nature of risk is even more graphically illustrated by the two
lotteries shown in Figure A.4. These have equal probabilities of failure
and equal expectations, but most people would prefer the lottery with the
lesser cost of failure. Here it is clear that the "spread" between the
best and worst outcomes (on a meaningful value scale) is an important
factor in determining the risk involved in the lottery. Generally, the
less the spread, the less the perceived risk in the venture.
Given these intricate ways in which the probabilities and the rewards
that define a lottery interact to generate risk, how can one develop logi-
cal and consistent procedures for choosing among uncertain propositions?
The answer can be found in the theory of risk preference,30 sometimes
called utility theory.3 >3S Given that an individual or an organization
such as NASA may not always want to "play the averages," risk preference
theory provides both procedures for assessing risk tolerance (a measure
of the organization's ability to withstand losses) and ways to predict
how the organization should want to choose among uncertain propositions
on the basis of this risk tolerance.
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FIGURE A.2 TWO SAMPLE LOTTERIES WITH EQUAL REWARDS (PROFITS), BUT
DIFFERENT PROBABILITIES
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FIGURE A.3 TWO SAMPLE LOTTERIES WHERE THE LOTTERY WITH THE LARGEST
EXPECTED LOSS ALSO HAS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED PROFIT
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EXPECTATION = 1/2 $90 - 1/2 $10
= $40
EXPECTATION = 1/2 $190 - 1/2 $110
= $40
FIGURE A.4 TWO SAMPLE LOTTERIES WITH EQUAL PROBABILITIES, AND EQUAL
EXPECTATIONS, BUT WITH UNEQUAL "RISK"
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The central concept of the theory of risk preference is the certain
equivalent. The certain equivalent profit of a lottery, such as those
shown in Figures A.2-4, is just the selling price, a "risk free" amount
for which one would exchange the lottery if he owned it. In general,
the certain equivalent of a lottery is less than its expectation by an
amount that depends on the resources of the organization and its ability
to tolerate the losses corresponding to the worst possible outcomes.
The relevance of this concept can be understood when the following
question is considered: Should NASA spend an extra $20 million on a
$50 million spacecraft and launch vehicle to reduce the probability of
mission failure from 0.2 to 0.05? Two such lotteries are portrayed in
Figure A. 5. The mission has been given a value of $100 million for
purpose of illustration. These lotteries typify the choices offered in
real life where additional safety and reliability in an already well-
engineered system is usually quite expensive. Naturally there is a point
of diminishing returns in procuring such refinements. Risk attitude can
be an important aspect in determining just where that point is.
In Figure A. 5, the additional $20 million spent to improve mission
reliability reduces the expected profit of the mission from $30 million
to $25 million, in spite of the reduced risk of failure. However, this
.$100 M - $50 M = $50 M $100 M - $70 M = $30 M
r0.95
0.05
.-$50 M .-$70 M
EXPECTATION = 0.8 * $50 M - 0.2 « $50 M
= $30 M
LOTTERY A
EXPECTATION = 0.95 * $30 M - 0.05 » $70 M
= $25 M
LOTTERY B
FIGURE A.5 TWO LOTTERIES WHICH REPRESENT TWO ALTERNATIVES DIFFERING
THROUGH THE EXPENDITURE OF AN EXTRA $20 M TO REDUCE THE
RISK OF FAILURE' FROM 0.2 TO 0.05 (ALL AMOUNTS IN DOLLAR
MILLIONS)
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does not necessarily imply that the lowest cost configuration is prefer-
able. Which lottery should rationally be preferred depends on the organi-
zation's risk tolerance, a purely subjective preference judgment. Fig-
ure A.6 shows how the certain equivalent of these two lotteries depends
on the risk tolerance under certain simple assumptions that are likely
.to be valid for NASA decisions involving these amounts of money. The
parameter y is the reciprocal of the risk tolerance, p. The curves
representing the certain equivalents of the two lotteries intersect at a
Y of about 0.008, whose reciprocal indicates a risk tolerance of approxi-
mately $125 million. Thus, if NASA's risk tolerance is $125 million, NASA
should spend the additional $20 million for greater reliability. If,
however, its tolerance for loss exceeds $125 million, spending such a
large amount for such a reliability gain is probably not justified.
This appendix has not explained how the risk aversion coefficient
Y (or equivalently the risk tolerance) should be determined for an organi-
zation like NASA. The encoding procedures for risk attitude described
in Reference 30 go part of the way, but there are still some practical
problems and some research to be done in this area. It must be recognized
that the appropriate organizational risk tolerance coefficient is a
management value judgment very similar to the choice of a discount rate.
An approach to determining a corporate risk attitude is described in
References 37 and 38. Even if the encoding procedures needed to determine
NASA's risk to tolerance for space exploration were completely clear, it
is still not obvious from the explanations presented here why the two
curves representing the certain equivalents of lotteries intersect at a
p of precisely $125 million. This amount bears little superficial rela-
tionship to any of the figures in Figure A.5.
The concepts introduced in this appendix have of necessity been only
loosely defined. A more comprehensive treatment of the theory and pro-
cedures needed to assess and apply these concepts to decisions in risky
situations can be found in References 30, 35, and 36. The purpose of this
appendix has been fulfilled if the reader understands the concept of a
lottery for representing uncertain propositions; realizes that values,
costs, and probabilities are all necessary for the subjective evaluation
of such lotteries; and can visualize the analogy between a lottery and
a space exploration mission. Then he will understand why our final
recommendation is that NASA select a problem in which uncertainty and
*
These assumptions, listed and discussed extensively in References 30 and
35, are those that lead to an exponential utility function. Exponential
utility functions, which are always characterized by a single "risk
aversion coefficient," have been used to develop the curves in Figure A.6.
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RISK TOLERANCE p = 1/7 (in millions)
$50 $33 $25
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0.01 0.02 0.03
RISK AVERSION COEFFICIENT 7 (in millionths)
0.04
FIGURE A.6 CERTAIN EQUIVALENT OF THE TWO LOTTERIES SHOWN IN FIGURE A.5
AS A FUNCTION OF RISK AVERSION COEFFICIENT 7
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risk attitude play a crucial role for a future application of decision
analysis. An ability to answer questions like the .one discussed above
(and illustrated in Figures A.5 and A.6) in a logical and consistent
way should be an important step toward a more "effective allocation of
NASA's diminishing resources for space exploration.
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